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GAYFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED AFFIRMATIVE  
ACTION POLICIES 
PETER NICOLAS

 
ABSTRACT 
Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court established a 
consistency principle in its race-based equal protection cases. That 
principle requires courts to apply the same strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications designed to benefit racial minorities—such as affirmative 
action policies—as they do to laws invidiously discriminating against 
them. 
The new consistency principle, under which discrimination against 
whites is subject to strict scrutiny, conflicted with the Court’s established 
criteria for declaring a group to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class 
entitled to heightened scrutiny, which focused on such considerations as 
the history of discrimination against the group and its political 
powerlessness. 
As a result of this tension, the Court’s line of precedents for identifying 
new suspect and quasi-suspect classes has gone dormant, and the Court 
has not since considered whether any additional such classes exist. 
Instead, when confronted with plausible candidates for heightened 
scrutiny, such as gays and lesbians, the Court has engaged in sporadic 
application of stealth rational basis review. 
In this Article, I use a hypothetical equal protection challenge to a 
sexual orientation-based affirmative action policy as a vehicle for 
proposing a roadmap for harmonizing these competing lines of precedent. 
I demonstrate that, in light of the consistency principle, an aggrieved 
heterosexual can bring a challenge to such a policy and seek heightened 
equal protection scrutiny even though the Court has yet to establish 
heightened scrutiny for laws discriminating against gays and lesbians. 
I conclude that such a harmonization of the Court’s equal protection 
precedents will reinvigorate the Court’s moribund precedents for 
identifying new suspect and quasi-suspect classes. Moreover, I conclude 
that announcing heightened scrutiny in such a case would present a 
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particularly appealing vehicle to the Court’s center, represented by 
Justice Kennedy, whose jurisprudence demonstrates both support for gay 
rights and hostility toward affirmative action policies. 
INTRODUCTION 
For much of American history, knowledge that a current or prospective 
student or employee was gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender was likely 
to result in the person losing their employment
1
 or being expelled from 
their college or university.
2
 Yet, as developments in both the judicial and 
legislative spheres have simultaneously resulted in the invalidation of laws 
criminalizing same-sex sexual activity
3
 and the validation of same-sex 
relationships,
4
 many employers and institutions of higher education have 
stopped treating one’s status as a sexual minority as a negative 
consideration and have instead come to view it as irrelevant to 
employment and admissions decisions. 
Still, what if—just as with racial minorities and women—public 
universities and employers decided not merely to react to the history of 
discrimination against sexual minorities by treating such status as 
irrelevant, but instead treated it as a positive consideration in making 
employment and admissions decisions? In other words, could a public 
employer or university decide that it would henceforth treat a prospective 
student’s or employee’s status as a sexual minority as a “plus” factor, or 
even establish specific hiring and admissions quotas? To justify doing so, 
would they have to point to their own specific history of discriminating 
against sexual minorities, or could they rely instead on general societal 
discrimination against that group? Could they instead justify such a policy 
on the grounds that it contributes to the diversity of the workplace or 
classroom, as a way to increase the provision of services to the LGBT 
community, or as a means of providing role models for LGBT youth? 
Moreover, if a heterosexual individual aggrieved by such a policy brought 
an equal protection
5
 challenge against it, what level of judicial scrutiny 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432–33 & n.25 (Conn. 2008); 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889 (Iowa 2009). 
 2. See, e.g., WILLIAM WRIGHT, HARVARD’S SECRET COURT: THE SAVAGE 1920 PURGE OF 
CAMPUS HOMOSEXUALS (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of 
the Closet, 1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 749–50 (1997). 
 3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 4. See PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE & 
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 3–10 (5th ed. 2014). 
 5. This Article refers to “equal protection” generally as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass not only the latter—which is applicable only to the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/8
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would a court apply to such a claim? Would the policy be subject only to 
the highly deferential rational basis review, or could the petitioner argue 
for intermediate, strict, or the “more searching form”6 of rational basis 
review? What impact would the level of scrutiny have on the 
constitutionality of such a policy? 
Although such affirmative action policies are yet to be established—at 
least as a formal matter—the foundation necessary for developing them in 
the future is being laid, as public entities begin to collect data on the 
sexual orientation of prospective applicants. For example, in December 
2012, the University of Iowa became the first public university to include 
questions about their applicants’ sexual orientation and gender identity on 
their admission applications.
7
 Subsequently, several public law schools 
began to include such a question on their admission applications.
8
 In 
addition, in 2013, Scholastica
9—a website that facilitates the submission 
of manuscripts to law reviews—created controversy amongst legal 
academics by asking authors to indicate their sexual orientation and gender 
identity in their profiles and forwarding that information to law review 
editors, including those at public universities.
10
 This led to claims that law 
reviews housed at public universities that made selection decisions based 
 
 
states—but also to the “equal protection” component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which applies to the federal government and is identical in scope. See Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224, 226–27 (1995). 
 6. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). 
 7. See University of Iowa Becomes First School to Add Sexual Orientation Question to 
Application, FOX NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/12/university-iowa-
becomes-first-school-to-add-sexual-orientation-question-to/, archived at http://perma.cc/8LNW-
6VW8. Although the University of Iowa was the first public university to do so, it was preceded by 
Elmhurst College, a private college. See Eric Hoover, Elmhurt College Will Ask Applicants About 
Sexual Orientation, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ 
headcount/elmhurst-college-will-ask-applicants-about-sexual-orientation/28553?sid=at&utm_source= 
at&utm_medium=en, archived at http://perma.cc/KKJ2-QMN2. 
 8. See Mary Sette, New Question Considered for LGBT Law Applicants, GW HATCHET (Feb. 4, 
2013), http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/04/a-new-question-for-lgbt-law-applicants/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/J4LW-YWWS.  
 9. For more a more detailed description of Scholastica, browse the website at 
https://scholasticahq.com. 
 10. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Journals on Scholastica “Ask Authors to Submit Demographic 
Information” for “Diversity Initiatives,” JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://josh 
blackman.com/blog/2013/02/11/journals-on-scholastica-ask-authors-to-submit-demographic-information-
for-diversity-initiatives/, archived at http://perma.cc/M5L9-HNT4; Scholastica’s Diversity Question, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 13, 2013), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/ 02/scholasticas-
diversity-question.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9EH-62CL; Dave Hoffman, Scholastica & Law 
Review Selection, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2013/02/scholastica-law-review-selection.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WJT3-GA96. 
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on such criteria were open to a constitutional challenge on equal protection 
grounds.
 
 
The constitutionality of affirmative action policies targeted at sexual 
minorities—herein dubbed “gayffirmative action”—stands at the 
intersection of three distinct lines of equal protection precedents. The first, 
culminating in the Court’s 2013 opinion Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin
11
 and hereinafter referred to as the Adarand
12
 line of precedent, has 
made it increasingly more difficult for public entities to implement 
affirmative action policies targeted at racial minorities. It has done so by 
applying a principle of “consistency” that requires such policies to be 
subject to the same “strict scrutiny” that the Court applies to state action 
discriminating against racial minorities.
13
 As a result, the Court has held 
that justifications for race-based affirmative action policies, such as 
creating role models for minority children,
14
 increasing the provision of 
services to minority communities,
15
 and as a remedy for general past 
societal discrimination, are constitutionally insufficient.
16
 Instead, only a 
handful of rationales that the Court has deemed to be “compelling”—such 
as the interests in remedying the government entity’s own past 
discrimination against that group (as contrasted with general past societal 
discrimination)
17
 and the interest in creating a diverse student body
18—are 
constitutionally sufficient to justify such policies. Moreover, applying 
strict scrutiny, the Court has held that even when invoking this narrow set 
of constitutionally sufficient justifications for such policies, the means of 
accomplishing those rationales must be very finely tuned and 
individualized and thus cannot be accomplished through such means as 
setting quotas.
19
 
 
 
 11. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 12. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 13. See id. at 224, 227, 229–30. 
 14. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497–98 (1989) (plurality opinion); 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 15. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310–11 (1978) (Powell, J.). The 
opinion is somewhat unclear on whether the Court did not find this interest to be sufficiently 
compelling, or if instead the policy was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieving that goal, or 
both. 
 16. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731–32 (2007) 
(plurality opinion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 496–97; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274. 
 17. See supra note 16. 
 18. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
 19. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/8
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The second line of equal protection precedent, culminating in the 
Court’s 2013 opinion in United States v. Windsor20 and hereinafter 
referred to as the Moreno
21
 line of precedent, has made it increasingly 
difficult for governmental entities to discriminate against sexual 
minorities by declaring unconstitutional laws that discriminate on that 
basis.
22
 In this line of cases, the Court has side-stepped the question 
whether laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation should be 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Rather, in each of the cases in this 
line of precedents, the Court invoked its earlier holding in United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
23
 that “a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group” is not a legitimate governmental interest even 
under rational basis review.
24
 
The third line of equal protection precedent—which has sat dormant 
since the Court announced its principle of “consistency” and hereinafter 
referred to as the Frontiero
25
 line of precedent—sets forth the criteria for 
deciding whether or not to accord heightened scrutiny to a given 
classification when challenged on equal protection grounds. Because this 
line of precedent predates the “consistency” line of precedent, many of the 
factors focus on the specific class against whom state action is directed 
(such as African Americans or women) rather than the classification 
employed (such as race or sex). Included among the factors are 
(1) whether the group against whom the classification is directed has 
suffered from a history of discrimination; (2) whether the group is 
politically powerless; (3) whether the characteristic at issue is obvious or 
visible; (4) whether the characteristic at issue bears any relationship to 
ability to perform or contribute to society; and (5) whether the 
characteristic at issue is immutable.
26
 
 
 
 20. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 21. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 22. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (declaring federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional, 
applying equal protection component of Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003) (declaring state sodomy laws violate Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, but acknowledging Equal Protection Clause as a conceivable alternative basis for 
doing so); id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (applying Equal Protection Clause); Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declaring Colorado’s Amendment 2 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 23. 413 U.S. at 534–35. 
 24. Id. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35. 
 25. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 26. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 
602–03 (1987); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A gayffirmative action policy that fell short of the standards imposed 
by the Court for race-based affirmative action policies would effect a 
merger of these three lines of equal protection cases and would require the 
Court to resolve a number of difficult questions that have been percolating 
in the background of equal protection jurisprudence ever since the Court 
switched its focus—at least so far as race and sex are concerned—from 
suspect classes to suspect classifications. 
Consider, for example, a public medical school that establishes an 
affirmative action policy designed to increase the number of gay and 
transgender medical students, and, ultimately, doctors. Suppose that the 
school cites two rationales for the policy: a desire to provide LGBT youth 
with positive role models, and a desire to increase the provision of medical 
services to members of the LGBT community, which the school believes 
have special medical needs that are often overlooked by heterosexual 
doctors. Moreover, suppose that, instead of merely considering it a “plus” 
factor in making admissions decisions, the school dedicates five percent of 
the seats in its class to sexual minorities, estimating that to be their 
percentage of the general population. 
While such a policy, if race-based, would clearly not pass 
constitutional muster if challenged by an aggrieved white individual, the 
constitutionality of such a policy, when challenged by a heterosexual 
similarly aggrieved by it, turns on the answers to a number of important 
questions, nearly all of which remain open. If such a law is subject merely 
to rational basis review, would it pass constitutional muster? Will the 
Court eventually apply the Frontiero line of precedent to hold that laws 
discriminating against sexual minorities are subject to intermediate or 
strict scrutiny? If so, will the Adarand line of precedent compel the Court 
to hold that laws discriminating against heterosexuals are similarly subject 
to that heightened level of judicial scrutiny? If heightened scrutiny is not 
established for laws that discriminate against sexual minorities at the time 
an aggrieved heterosexual brings suit, could he simultaneously invoke the 
criteria for applying heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against 
sexual minorities set forth in the Frontiero line of precedent, coupled with 
the “consistency” principle set forth in the Adarand line of precedent, to 
justify the application of intermediate or strict scrutiny to the law? To the 
extent that there was evidence that the policy was motivated by “animus” 
against heterosexuals, could the aggrieved plaintiff seek to have the Court 
 
 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976); 
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684–88; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/8
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apply the “more searching form” of rational basis review set forth in the 
Moreno line of precedent, in reliance on the ground that heterosexuals are 
a “politically unpopular group?” Finally, if the state in which the medical 
school is located has established precedent subjecting laws discriminating 
against sexual minorities to a higher level of scrutiny as a matter of state 
constitutional law than that applicable under federal equal protection 
jurisprudence, and the plaintiff invokes that state constitutional provision, 
would the state be compelled as a matter of federal equal protection 
jurisprudence to apply the principle of “consistency” and extend 
heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against heterosexuals? 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
equal protection jurisprudence in general and traces the development of 
the Frontiero, Adarand, and Moreno lines of precedent. Part II of this 
Article demonstrates that—in the absence of heightened equal protection 
scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications—a quota-based 
gayffirmative action policy justified by such goals as creating role models 
for LGBT youth and providing services to the LGBT community would 
easily pass constitutional muster under traditional rational basis review. 
Part III independently examines the Frontiero and Adarand lines of 
precedent to demonstrate that laws discriminating against sexual 
minorities should eventually be deemed by the Court to be subject to 
intermediate or strict scrutiny and that the “consistency” principle likely 
will require that same level of scrutiny to be applied to laws discriminating 
against heterosexuals. Part IV of this Article addresses the question 
whether a heterosexual individual aggrieved by such an affirmative action 
policy can argue for heightened scrutiny—even in the absence of 
precedent establishing intermediate or strict scrutiny for laws 
discriminating against sexual minorities—either by invoking the Frontiero 
and Adarand lines of precedent in tandem or invoking the Moreno line of 
precedent. Part V of this Article addresses the question whether a state 
with established precedent subjecting laws discriminating against sexual 
minorities to a higher level of scrutiny as a matter of state constitutional 
law than that applicable under federal equal protection jurisprudence 
would be compelled as a matter of federal equal protection jurisprudence 
to apply the principle of “consistency” and extend heightened scrutiny to 
laws discriminating against heterosexuals. 
This Article proposes that these three lines of equal protection 
precedent can best be harmonized by formally recognizing two separate 
methods of obtaining heightened equal protection scrutiny that are an 
outgrowth of the factors identified in the Frontiero line of precedent. 
Under this approach, the political powerlessness factor stands on its own 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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as a basis for obtaining a “more searching form” of rational basis review 
for laws targeting a politically unpopular group. This is represented by the 
Moreno line of precedent and is focused exclusively on the relative 
political power of the class impacted by any given law, making it a “one 
way” form of review that can only be invoked by situation-specific 
powerless classes of persons who are the targets of legislative animus. The 
remaining factors, coupled with the Adarand line of precedent, can be 
abstracted in a way that is focused on the nature of the classification 
employed rather than the specific class impacted by any given law, making 
the intermediate or strict scrutiny that follows from application of those 
precedents something that can be invoked, in the first instance, not only by 
classes of persons that are relatively politically powerless, but rather by 
anyone who is classified using suspect or quasi-suspect criteria. 
This Article concludes that announcing heightened scrutiny in such a 
case—which under the consistency principle would benefit gays and 
lesbians in battles over marriage equality, parenting rights, and the like—
would present a particularly appealing vehicle to the Court’s center, 
represented by Justice Kennedy, whose jurisprudence to date 
simultaneously demonstrates support for gay rights and hostility toward 
affirmative action policies. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Overview of Equal Protection Jurisprudence 
Modern-day equal protection jurisprudence is characterized by tiered 
levels of scrutiny, whereby the level of scrutiny varies depending upon the 
classification involved or the right affected. The tiered approach was 
described by the Court in its 1988 decision Clark v. Jeter
27
 as follows: 
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . we apply 
different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a 
minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on race or 
national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights, are 
given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of 
rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate 
 
 
 27. 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/8
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scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory 
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.
28
 
Under the tiered approach, the higher the level of scrutiny, the greater the 
judicial scrutiny of both the legislative end sought to be accomplished by 
the law and the means for achieving that end. At the lowest level of 
review—rational basis—the end need only be legitimate (and need not 
even be the real rationale for the law, but merely a hypothesized one), and 
the means employed to achieve that end need only be “rationally related” 
to achieving it, allowing for substantial over- and under-inclusiveness.
29
 
At the opposite extreme—strict scrutiny—the end must be compelling and 
the means employed to achieve that end “narrowly tailored” so as to 
eliminate over- or under-inclusiveness.
30
 Between the two is intermediate 
scrutiny, which requires an “important” government interest and a means 
that is “substantially related” to achieving that end.31 
Much of the complexity of modern-day equal protection jurisprudence 
can be traced to two competing forces that have shaped it: a general desire 
on the part of the Supreme Court to distance itself from the Lochner
32
 
era—a period in which the Court was subject to heavy criticism for 
interfering with and second-guessing the legislative process through an 
aggressive interpretation of its powers under the Due Process Clauses—
coupled with a desire to maintain a safety valve that allows the Court to 
step in and strike legislation down that targets a vulnerable group. 
The roots of these two competing forces appear in the Court’s 1938 
post-Lochner decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
33
 where 
the Court—after rejecting a substantive due process challenge to a federal 
statute—describes the similarly deferential “rational basis” standard 
applicable to equal protection challenges: 
The . . . equal protection clause . . . does not compel . . . 
Legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or none. A Legislature may hit 
at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at 
another. 
 . . . . 
 
 
 28. Id. at 461 (citations omitted). 
 29. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–16 (1993); Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 108 (1979). 
 30. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 31. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. 
 32. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 33. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the 
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a 
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some 
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators.
34
 
The Court subsequently reiterated the deferential nature of its default level 
of equal protection scrutiny in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.:
35
 
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, 
admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may 
be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different 
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may 
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting 
the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no 
further than the invidious discrimination.
36
 
Yet, in what has been termed “the most celebrated footnote in 
constitutional law,”37 the Carolene Products Court set forth an important 
caveat: 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more 
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or 
racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
 
 
 34. Id. at 151–52. 
 35. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 36. Id. at 489 (citations omitted). 
 37. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 
(1982). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/8
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relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
38
 
But how has the Court come to decide that certain classifications are 
subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny, while others are entitled merely 
to rational basis review? Moreover, how is it that a caveat in Carolene 
Products referring to the possibility of heightened scrutiny for 
discrimination against “discrete and insular minorities” has come to result 
in the application of heightened judicial scrutiny for discrimination against 
whites? Finally, if heightened scrutiny is inapplicable, does rational basis 
review ever result in the invalidation of legislation, and if so, when? The 
answers to these questions are provided, respectively, by the Frontiero, 
Adarand, and Moreno lines of equal protection precedent. 
B. Development of the Frontiero, Adarand, and Moreno Lines of 
Precedent 
1. Factors Required to Accord Heightened Scrutiny: The Frontiero 
Line of Precedent 
The roots of what today is referred to as strict scrutiny grew out of 
dictum in a pair of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during World 
War II involving a curfew for and the internment of persons of Japanese 
ancestry. Although the measures were upheld by the Court, the decisions 
used language suggesting that equal protection claims involving race 
would be subject to more rigorous scrutiny than run-of-the-mill equal 
protection claims. The Court wrote that “racial discriminations are in most 
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,”39 and that “all legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect” and thus that “courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny.”40 
Yet, it was not until the 1960s that this promising dictum bore fruit, 
with the Court citing it in both its 1964 decision McLaughlin v. Florida,
41
 
declaring unconstitutional a law prohibiting interracial cohabitation, and 
its 1967 decision Loving v. Virginia,
42
 declaring unconstitutional a law 
prohibiting interracial marriage. In McLaughlin, the Court began to sketch 
 
 
 38. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 39. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
 40. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 41. 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
 42. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
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out the heightened level of review the Court would employ for racial 
classifications, specifically distinguishing Lee Optical and holding that a 
racial classification “will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely 
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy,”43 a 
standard that the Court reiterated in Loving.
44
 The Court would for some 
time vacillate in the language it used to describe the strength of the state 
interest—a vacillation to which it attributed no importance45—and would 
ultimately rephrase the standard as one requiring that it be narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.
46
 
With cases such as McLaughlin and Loving making clear that strict 
scrutiny could result in the invalidation of laws challenged on equal 
protection grounds, litigants began to contend that strict scrutiny should be 
available to challenge laws targeting other disadvantaged groups, such as 
aliens, the poor, women, the elderly, the mentally retarded, and children 
born out of wedlock. In a series of cases decided in the 1970s and the 
1980s, the Court accepted the claims of some of these groups and rejected 
others. In so doing, the Court set forth a series of factors designed to 
distinguish those classifications that, like race or national origin, merited 
heightened equal protection scrutiny. 
The Court first considered expanding the number of groups entitled to 
strict scrutiny in its 1971 decision Graham v. Richardson,
47
 where it 
addressed the question whether laws discriminating against aliens were 
subject to strict scrutiny. The Court—with little analysis—concluded that 
they were, quoting from the caveat contained in Carolene Products’ 
famous footnote and concluding that “[a]liens as a class are a prime 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened 
judicial solicitude is appropriate.”48 
Two years later, in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,
49
 the Court rejected an argument that a law discriminating 
against the poor was subject to heightened scrutiny. Without citation to 
any cases, the Court concluded that the poor, which it described as a 
“large, diverse, and amorphous class,” has “none of the traditional indicia 
of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected 
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
 
 
 43. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 194, 196. 
 44. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 45. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973). 
 46. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 47. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 48. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
 49. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”50 
Rodriguez thus appeared to identify two considerations—a group’s 
history of discrimination and its lack of political power—as relevant in 
determining whether or not to apply heightened scrutiny to laws 
discriminating against that group. 
Less than two months later, a plurality of the Court—in Frontiero v. 
Richardson
51—concluded that strict scrutiny was required for laws that 
discriminate against women. The Court identified six considerations that it 
believed, like race and national origin, made strict scrutiny appropriate. 
First, it noted the history of discrimination against women was comparable 
to that of African Americans.
52
 Second, it noted the “high visibility” of a 
person’s sex.53 Third, while acknowledging that women as a group were 
not “a small and powerless minority,” it nonetheless took note of their 
relative lack of political power.
54
 Fourth, it noted that “sex, like race and 
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the 
accident of birth.”55 Fifth, it differentiated sex from non-suspect statuses—
such as intelligence or physical ability—on the ground that it “frequently 
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”56 Finally, it 
took note of the fact that Congress had enacted legislation designed to 
combat sex discrimination, and held that the fact that a coequal branch of 
government has concluded that sex discrimination is invidious is a 
relevant consideration in deciding whether to accord a class heightened 
scrutiny.
57
 Although only a plurality opinion and thus arguably offering 
limited precedential value,
58
 nearly all of the factors have been reaffirmed 
in some fashion in subsequent Court decisions. 
Three years later, in 1976, the Court issued a pair of decisions rejecting 
arguments that discrimination on the basis of age or illegitimacy should be 
subject to strict scrutiny. The Court—citing Rodriguez—concluded in 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
59
 that, unlike those 
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, the elderly 
 
 
 50. Id. at 28. 
 51. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 52. Id. at 684–85. 
 53. Id. at 686. 
 54. Id. at 686 & n.17. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 687–88. 
 58. See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1010–11 (D. Nev. 2012). 
 59. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). 
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have not experienced “‘a history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been 
subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics 
not truly indicative of their abilities.”60 Furthermore, citing Carolene 
Products, the Court noted that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and 
insular’ group” because it “marks a stage that each of us will reach if we 
live out our normal span.”61 The Murgia Court seemed to reinforce three 
of the Frontiero factors: the absence of a history of discrimination, the fact 
that old age is related to ability to perform or contribute to society, and the 
fact that age is mutable and thus old age is a classification that nearly all 
persons will eventually experience. 
With respect to illegitimacy, the Court acknowledged in Mathews v. 
Lucas
62
 that the status was in some ways analogous to race and national 
origin; it is “not within the control of the illegitimate individual”—thus 
making it effectively immutable—and that status “bears no relation to the 
individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society.”63 But it 
contrasted illegitimacy with race and sex—the latter of which the Court 
assumed to be subject to strict scrutiny based on the plurality opinion in 
Frontiero
64—on the ground that it “does not carry an obvious badge,” and 
as a result of that invisibility, the illegitimate did not experience the 
“pervasive[] . . . historic[al] legal and political discrimination” experienced 
by women and African Americans.
65
 Yet, despite the Court’s 
unwillingness to declare illegitimacy a suspect class, it nonetheless did—
in cases decided both prior and subsequent to Mathews—declare 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds laws that discriminated on 
the basis of illegitimacy. The Court, while not specifying the level of 
scrutiny it was applying, focused on the unjustness of laws that target a 
status over which the illegitimate child lacks control, thus focusing on 
effective immutability.
66
 Moreover, the Mathews Court acknowledged that 
the standard to be applied in evaluating such laws was “not a toothless 
one,”67 and in subsequent cases, the Court acknowledged that laws 
 
 
 60. Id. at 313 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28). 
 61. Id. at 313–14. 
 62. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
 63. Id. at 505. 
 64. See id. at 506. 
 65. Id. at 506. 
 66. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769–70 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972). 
 67. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510. 
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discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy were entitled to “somewhat 
heightened review.”68 
In the final days of 1976, the Court in Craig v. Boren
69
 once again 
revisited the question regarding equal protection scrutiny for laws that 
discriminate on the basis of sex. In the intervening years since Frontiero, 
the Court had decided several other equal protection challenges based on 
sex, but had disposed of them without definitively resolving the standard 
of review.
70
 Moreover, Craig differed from Frontiero: the discrimination 
complained about in Craig directly targeted men, not women. The Court 
for the first time announced what has since come to be known as 
intermediate scrutiny. Without citation to any particular cases (leading to a 
charge by Justice Rehnquist in dissent that the test had been created out of 
“thin air”),71 the Court wrote that “previous cases establish that 
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”72 
The Court did not discuss or revisit the factors it had identified in 
Frontiero and built upon in subsequent cases, nor how those factors would 
impact the determination whether to accord a group intermediate or strict 
scrutiny. 
Six years passed before the Court gave serious consideration to a claim 
that a group should be accorded heightened equal protection scrutiny. In 
1982, in Plyler v. Doe,
73
 the Court rejected the idea that laws 
discriminating against illegal aliens in general were subject to heightened 
scrutiny, noting that the status was the product of “voluntary action” in 
illegally entering the country and thus could not be said to be immutable.
74
 
However, with respect to laws discriminating against the children of 
illegal aliens—at least those involving education—the Court viewed their 
status, like that of illegitimate children, as effectively immutable, and 
appeared to apply something akin to intermediate scrutiny.
75
 
The Court last engaged in an in-depth application of the factors for 
determining whether a given classification was entitled to heightened 
equal protection scrutiny in 1985 with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
 
 
 68. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 
 69. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 70. See id. at 198 (collecting cases). 
 71. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 197. 
 73. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 74. Id. at 219 n.19. 
 75. Id. at 218–30. 
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Center Inc.,
76
 which addressed whether discrimination against the 
mentally retarded should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. In deciding 
that it should not be, the Court addressed and refined many of the factors 
set forth in its earlier cases.
77
 The Court first acknowledged that mental 
retardation is an immutable characteristic, but that—unlike race or sex—it 
does relate to their ability to perform.
78
 Next, the Court noted the great 
deal of federal and state legislation enacted to protect the mentally 
retarded, which the Court viewed as a sign that the mentally retarded are 
not politically powerless.
79
 As such, the Cleburne Court effectively 
nullified the sixth Frontiero factor, which viewed the enactment of anti-
discrimination legislation by a coequal branch as further evidence of a 
group’s suspect nature.80 The Court went on to refine what it means to be 
“politically powerless,” indicating that it does not mean “powerless to 
assert direct control over the legislature,” but instead that the group has 
“no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.”81 Finally, the Court 
relied on a consideration first noted by the Rodriguez Court: the fact that 
the group was “large and amorphous” militated against according them 
heightened scrutiny.
82
 
The following year, in Lyng v. Castillo,
83
 the Court gave short shrift to 
a claim that discrimination against “close relatives” should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. While short on analysis, the opinion is salient because 
it reorganized the factors in a way that presented some of them in the 
disjunctive. The Lyng Court thus identified the three relevant inquiries as 
(1) whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination; (2) whether 
the group exhibits “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics 
that define them as a discrete group”; and (3) whether they are either a 
minority or politically powerless.
84
 
The Court’s 1988 decision in Clark v. Jeter85—involving 
discrimination on the basis of legitimacy—marked the last time that the 
Court formally announced a heightened level of scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause for a previously unrecognized group. As with Craig, 
 
 
 76. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 77. See id.  
 78. See id. at 442–43. 
 79. See id. at 443–45. 
 80. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973). 
 81. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added). 
 82. See id. at 445–46. 
 83. 477 U.S. 635, 641 (1986). 
 84. Id. at 638. Accord Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987). 
 85. 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
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however, the Court did not engage in any sort of analysis of the factors 
identified in its earlier cases, but simply characterized its earlier decisions 
as standing for the proposition that intermediate scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard.
86
 
Since its decision in Lyng, the Court has rarely mentioned the relevant 
factors for according a group heightened scrutiny, and when it has done 
so, they have only been mentioned in passing,
87
 as the Court in a majority 
opinion has not in any subsequent case analyzed a claim for heightened 
class-based equal protection scrutiny.
88
 As will be shown in the section 
that follows, this silence on the Court’s part starting in the late 1980s can 
be directly tied to the rise of the “consistency” line of precedent that took 
root at the same time. 
2. The Rise of the Consistency Requirement: The Adarand Line of 
Precedent 
In terms, the Equal Protection Clause appears to be neutral and of 
broad application, providing that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”89 However, the 
Clause itself was part of a series of amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
enacted with the specific purpose of protecting the recently emancipated 
slaves, and in the first decision interpreting it, the Court in 1873 suggested 
that it not only was limited to claims of racial discrimination, but further 
that it operated in a one-way fashion so as to protect only African 
Americans: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by 
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account 
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this 
provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that 
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application 
to any other.
90
 
 
 
 86. See id. at 461. 
 87. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293–94 (2004); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 83 (2000); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993). 
 88. Justice Scalia mentioned the factors in a 1996 dissent in which he suggested that sex should 
be downgraded to rational basis review on the theory that women—who constitute a majority of the 
electorate—cannot reasonably be described as a discrete and insular minority unable to employ the 
political process. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 90. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). 
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With regard to the first suggested limitation, history would show, as 
Justice Rehnquist would later note, that the “Court has proved Mr. Justice 
Miller a bad prophet with respect to nonracial classification.”91 With 
regard to the second suggested limitation, seven years later, in Strauder v. 
West Virginia,
92
 the Court, in declaring unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds a statute excluding African Americans from grand and 
petit juries, indicated—albeit in dicta—that the Clause would not 
necessarily operate in a one-way fashion, at least if whites were in the 
minority in a given jurisdiction: 
If in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of 
the entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white 
men from jury service, thus denying to them the privilege of 
participating equally with the blacks in the administration of justice, 
we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a 
denial to white men of the equal protection of the laws. Nor if a law 
should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would 
there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the 
amendment.
93
 
Of course, this question was for most of U.S. history a theoretical one, 
since every law the Court confronted until the 1970s involved 
discrimination against African Americans.
94
 But in 1978, the Court for the 
first time confronted the question whether a race-based affirmative action 
policy benefiting racial minorities was to be subjected to the same strict 
scrutiny applied to laws that invidiously discriminated against them. The 
Court, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
95
 declared unlawful 
a medical school’s affirmative action policy under which sixteen of one 
hundred seats were reserved for racial minorities. The Court could not 
agree on a rationale, but the opinion penned by Justice Powell—
announcing the judgment of the Court—declared that such classifications 
should be subject to strict scrutiny, reasoning that “[t]he guarantee of 
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual 
and something else when applied to a person of another color.”96 Justice 
 
 
 91. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 178 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 92. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 93. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
 94. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213–18 (1995). 
 95. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 96. Id. at 289–90. 
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Powell’s opinion in Bakke was thus the first opinion in which the concept 
of “consistency” had been suggested outside of dictum. 
In Bakke, four Justices avoided the equal protection issue altogether, 
deciding the case on statutory grounds,
97
 while the remaining four Justices 
indicated that the application of strict scrutiny to a law discriminating 
against whites was inconsistent with the factors for according heightened 
scrutiny set forth in its earlier cases. These same four Justices noted that 
whites as a class are “‘not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to 
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.’”98 Justice Powell 
acknowledged that many of the Court’s decisions had considered factors 
such as “discreteness and insularity,” but concluded that these 
considerations were relevant to deciding “whether or not to add new types 
of classifications to the list of ‘suspect’ categories.”99 In Justice Powell’s 
view, racial and ethnic classifications were sui generis, and thus subject to 
strict scrutiny “without regard to these additional characteristics.”100 
It was not until 1989 in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
101
 that five 
Justices signed onto opinions declaring that race-based affirmative action 
policies benefiting racial minorities were to be subjected to the same strict 
scrutiny applied to laws that invidiously discriminated against them, and 
not until 1995 in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
102
 that the Court 
made clear that this standard applied not only to equal protection claims 
brought against the states, but also those brought against the federal 
government. Yet, in the intervening years, there were a number of 
developments in equal protection jurisprudence outside of race that 
foreshadowed the application of strict scrutiny to all race-based 
affirmative action policies. 
First, as indicated above, in 1976, the Court announced for the first 
time in Craig v. Boren,
103
 that laws discriminating on the basis of sex were 
to be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, Craig was a case in which 
men, not women, were bringing the constitutional challenge on the ground 
 
 
 97. Id. at 408–11 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, J.J., and Burger, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 98. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackman, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
 99. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 102. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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that the law disadvantaged men. Accordingly, in Craig, the Court in effect 
adopted the principle of consistency sub silentio, at least so far as sex was 
concerned. Writing in dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted the inconsistency 
between the Court’s rationale for applying heightened scrutiny to laws 
disfavoring women in Frontiero and its decision to accord heightened 
scrutiny to laws disfavoring men: 
Most obviously unavailable to support any kind of special scrutiny 
in this case, is a history or pattern of past discrimination, such as 
was relied on by the plurality in Frontiero to support its invocation 
of strict scrutiny. There is no suggestion in the Court’s opinion that 
males in this age group are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged, 
subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in need 
of special solicitude from the courts.
104
 
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
105
 a post-Craig, pre-
Croson decision, the Court reaffirmed the consistency principle (without 
so labeling it), emphasizing that the fact that a law “discriminates against 
males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or 
reduce the standard of review.”106 In turn, a plurality of the Court in a pre-
Croson case cited Hogan in a race-based affirmative action case for the 
general proposition that “the level of scrutiny does not change merely 
because the challenged classification operates against a group that 
historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.”107 
The second intervening development occurred in 1985, when the Court 
issued its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
108
 In 
addition to its application of the Frontiero and other factors from its prior 
cases, the Court also indicated another reason for declining to subject laws 
discriminating against the mentally retarded to intermediate scrutiny: 
It may be . . . that legislation designed to benefit, rather than 
disadvantage, the retarded would generally withstand examination 
under a test of heightened scrutiny. . . . Even assuming that many of 
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an 
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legislature to 
 
 
 104. Id. at 219 (Rehquist, J., dissenting). 
 105. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
 106. Id. at 723. 
 107. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986). 
 108. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting at 
all.
109
 
Thus, the Cleburne Court seemed to take as given a general underlying 
consistency principle that would require laws designed to benefit the 
mentally retarded to be subjected to the same heightened scrutiny that they 
were seeking in Cleburne to have applied to laws discriminating against 
them. 
Given the opinion of Justice Powell in Bakke and the assumption of 
consistency underlying some of the Court’s non-race equal protection 
cases, the Court’s 1989 decision in Croson requiring the application of 
strict scrutiny to state affirmative action policies benefiting racial 
minorities
110
 is perhaps somewhat less shocking than it first appears. 
Nonetheless, like Justice Rehnquist in Craig, Justice Marshall, dissenting 
in Croson, noted how the decision was at odds with the Court’s decisions 
setting forth the factors for deciding whether or not to accord heightened 
scrutiny to a class.
111
 It is thus not surprising that the Frontiero line of 
cases went dormant around this same time, since the two lines of 
precedent are—at least as presently configured—difficult to reconcile. 
Still, it was possible even after Croson for the Court to limit the scope 
of its consistency principle in two distinct ways. First, Croson involved an 
equal protection clause challenge against a state. Because the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply against 
the federal government, litigants must instead invoke the “equal 
protection” principle that the Court has found embodied within the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
112
 Because the sources of 
protection differ, it remained possible to subject them to different 
standards. Second, the facts of Croson itself were akin to the hypothetical 
jurisdiction described by the Court over 100 years earlier in Strauder:  
 Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal 
protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the 
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the 
representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be 
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. One of the central 
 
 
 109. Id. at 444. 
 110. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality opinion); 
id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 111. See id. at 553–54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice Rehnquist quietly joined the 
majority opinion. 
 112. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
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arguments for applying a less exacting standard to “benign” racial 
classifications is that such measures essentially involve a choice 
made by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves. . . . 
 In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the 
population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the 
city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority 
will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on 
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to 
militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial 
scrutiny in this case.
113
 
Given this unusual factual scenario, it was thus possible in future cases to 
limit Croson to the situation in which a racial classification is made and 
the race negatively impacted by the classification is in the minority in the 
particular jurisdiction in which it is implemented. 
The Court briefly flirted with the first distinction, holding just one year 
later in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
114
 that benign racial 
classifications imposed by the federal government were subject only to 
intermediate scrutiny.
115
 But just five years later, the Court in Adarand 
overturned Metro Broadcasting, emphasizing not only the newly coined 
principle of “consistency”—that the “standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or 
benefited by a particular classification”116—but also the newly coined 
principle of “congruence”— that “‘Equal protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’”117 Moreover, unlike Croson, the affirmative action policy 
at issue was federal, and thus enacted in a jurisdiction in which African 
Americans and the other groups benefiting from the policy were squarely 
in the minority. Thus, by 1995, the consistency principle was firmly rooted 
in equal protection jurisprudence, at least with respect to sex and race 
discrimination.  
 
 
 113. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495–96. 
 114. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 
(1995). 
 115. See id. at 564–65. 
 116. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494). 
 117. Id. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)). 
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3. Rational Basis “Plus” Review: The Moreno Line of Precedent 
In 1973—the same year that the Court issued its decision in Frontiero 
setting forth the factors for determining when to apply heightened equal 
protection scrutiny, the Court in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno
118
 also considered an equal protection challenge to the 
constitutionality of an amendment to a federal statute, the Food Stamp 
Act, which rendered ineligible to participate in the program any household 
containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the 
household. On its face, the Act created two rather neutral-looking classes 
of persons, those living in “households all of whose members are related 
to one another,” and those living “in households containing one or more 
members who are unrelated to the rest.”119 Yet, the Court noted, lurking in 
the background of the Act was an effort to target a particular group, 
specifically, “hippies” and “hippie communes.”120 
It would have been quite a stretch for the Moreno Court to apply the 
Frontiero factors and conclude that hippies were a suspect class. The 
Court did not attempt to do so, nor did it purport to be applying anything 
more than rational basis scrutiny.
121
 Yet, after reciting the evidence that 
the purpose of the amendment was to target hippies and hippie communes, 
the Court wrote: 
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by 
reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional 
conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it 
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.
122
 
The Court then proceeded to declare the law unconstitutional,
123
 applying 
what can perhaps be referred to as an aggressive or heightened form of 
rational basis review. Indeed, even the concurring opinion—which agreed 
with the result in the case—acknowledged that the law would pass 
traditional rational basis review.
124
 
 
 
 118. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 119. Id. at 529. 
 120. Id. at 534. 
 121. See id. at 533–34. 
 122. Id. at 534 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 538. 
 124. See id. at 542–44 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
756 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:733 
 
 
 
 
To be sure, Moreno did not mark the first instance in which the Court 
purported to apply rational basis review to an equal protection claim but in 
truth applied something more substantial. In the two years immediately 
preceding Moreno, the Court issued a pair of decisions, Reed v. Reed
125
 
and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Insurance Co.,
126
 which declared 
unconstitutional laws discriminating, respectively, on the basis of sex and 
legitimacy. In each case, the Court purported to apply only rational basis 
review
127—which virtually always results in upholding the validity of the 
law under the deferential standard articulated in cases such as Carolene 
Products and Lee Optical—yet nonetheless declared the laws to violate 
the equal protection clause. In fact, Weber was itself preceded three years 
earlier by Levy v. Louisiana,
128
 in which the Court did much the same 
thing with respect to illegitimacy discrimination. One might thus contend 
that this marked an era in which the Court more generally sought to 
transform rational basis review into something more substantial and less 
deferential than the test articulated in Carolene Products and Lee Optical. 
Yet, as I have remarked elsewhere,
129
 what distinguishes the 
heightened rational basis review in cases such as Reed and Weber on the 
one hand from Moreno on the other is the subsequent trajectory of the 
decisions. Reed and Weber are what I have described as “transitional 
rational basis plus” cases, in which the Court: mouths the language of 
rational basis while in fact applies what appears to be some form of 
heightened scrutiny; subsequently explicitly holds that laws discriminating 
on that basis are subject to heightened scrutiny; and re-characterizes its 
earlier decisions as actually applying heightened scrutiny despite their use 
of rational basis parlance.
130
 Both Reed and Weber followed this pattern, 
with the Court eventually subjecting sex and illegitimacy classifications to 
intermediate scrutiny and so characterizing the earlier decisions.
131
 
Moreno, by contrast, is not a “transitional rational basis plus” case. It 
was the first and last time that the Court addressed a claim involving 
discrimination against “hippies” and “hippie communes.” The Court did 
not go on to subsequently hold that “hippies” are a suspect class (or, in 
 
 
 125. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 126. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
 127. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76; Reed, 404 U.S. at 75–76. 
 128. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 129. See PETER NICOLAS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
267, 282–83 (2013). 
 130. See id. at 267. 
 131. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–84 (1973). 
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post-Adarand lingo, that “hippiness” or “hippie orientation” is a suspect 
classification). Rather, Moreno is what I have described as a “fleeting 
rational basis plus case,” in which the Court applies an intermittent form 
of heightened rational basis review based on the specific facts of the case, 
namely, what it sees as a temporary breakdown in the political process 
whereby a law appears to be enacted for the purpose of harming a 
politically unpopular group, albeit a group which does not merit 
heightened scrutiny under the Frontiero factors.
132
 
In his book The Constitutional Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the 
Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection, Evan Gerstmann contends that 
the Court decided to create intermediate scrutiny and to re-characterize its 
earlier decisions striking down laws discriminating on the basis of sex and 
legitimacy as applying such scrutiny for the specific purpose of returning 
rational basis review to its Carolene Products-Lee Optical roots and 
preventing litigants from citing cases such as Reed, Levy, and Weber for 
the more general proposition that rational basis review is not toothless but 
in fact substantial.
133
 
Gerstmann may well be correct about the intent of the Court, or at least 
some of its members, in acknowledging intermediate scrutiny, and 
subsequent to the creation of intermediate scrutiny in 1976, Moreno lay 
dormant for some time. Yet the development of the consistency line of 
precedent in the second half of the 1980s, whose tension with the 
Frontiero line of cases halted the development of that line of cases, 
simultaneously resulted in the reemergence of Moreno’s “fleeting rational 
basis plus” standard of review. 
Moreno first resurfaced in the Court’s 1985 decision Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
134
 As noted above, Cleburne marked the last 
time that the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of the factors that 
determine whether or not to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny. It 
also was a case that provided an early signal of the establishment of the 
consistency principle, with its assumption that applying heightened 
scrutiny to laws discriminating against the mentally retarded would result 
in the application of that same level of scrutiny to laws designed to benefit 
the mentally retarded.
135
 
 
 
 132. See NICOLAS, supra note 129, at 282–83. 
 133. See EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE 
FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 42–44, 52–53 (1999). 
 134. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 135. See id. at 443–45. 
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Yet, after rejecting the application of anything greater than rational 
basis review to the law at issue, the Cleburne Court proceeded to declare 
the law unconstitutional as applied. The Court began its analysis by 
quoting Moreno for the proposition that “some objectives—such as ‘a bare 
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group’—are not legitimate state 
interests.”136 The Court then applied a level of scrutiny to the law, akin to 
Moreno, that lacked the deference normally associated with traditional 
rational basis review.
137
 Moreover, like Moreno, the Court did not 
characterize the classification at issue in the case as suspect or quasi-
suspect.
138
 
This departure from traditional rational basis review in Cleburne was 
noted by Justice Marshall, who penned a separate opinion. Justice 
Marshall characterized Moreno as an “intermediate review decision[] 
masquerading in rational-basis language,”139 and similarly characterized 
the majority’s opinion in Cleburne: 
[T]he Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and 
perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called “second 
order” rational-basis review rather than “heightened scrutiny.” But 
however labeled, the rational basis test invoked today is most 
assuredly not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical . . . 
and [its] progeny.
140
 
Specifically, Justice Marshall identified three ways the analysis in 
Cleburne differed from traditional rational basis review: (1) it focused on 
the underinclusiveness of the law, whereas traditional rational basis review 
permits substantial underinclusiveness; (2) it looked for evidence in the 
record to support the alleged rationale for the law, even though traditional 
rational basis review does not require support in the record; and (3) it 
appeared to place the burden on the government, whereas with traditional 
rational basis the burden is on the challenger.
141
 Justice Marshall went on 
to articulate the twin dangers associated with the majority’s approach: 
The suggestion that the traditional rational-basis test allows this sort 
of searching inquiry creates precedent for this Court and lower 
courts to subject economic and commercial classifications to similar 
 
 
 136. Id. at 446–47 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 137. See id. 447. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 459 n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 140. Id. at 458. 
 141. See id. at 458–59. 
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and searching “ordinary” rational-basis review—a small and 
regrettable step back toward the days of Lochner v. New York. 
Moreover, by failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s 
“second order” rational-basis review, the Court provides no 
principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry 
is to be invoked. Lower courts are thus left in the dark on this 
important question, and this Court remains unaccountable for its 
decisions employing, or refusing to employ, particularly searching 
scrutiny.
142
 
Consistent with Justice Marshall’s critique, the Court, in subsequent 
cases—at least in subsequent cases in which it was not inclined to overturn 
the law at issue—rejected arguments by litigants that Moreno and 
Cleburne established a more rigorous standard of review, instead 
describing them as a mere application of the traditional rational basis 
test.
143
 
C.  At the Crossroads: The Gay Rights Cases 
In 1985—the same year in which the Court issued its opinion in 
Cleburne rejecting intermediate scrutiny for laws targeting the mentally 
retarded while simultaneously applying Moreno-style rational basis review 
to strike down the law—the Court declined to grant certiorari in a case 
raising the question whether discrimination against gay or bisexual 
persons violated the equal protection guarantee.
144
 Justice Brennan, joined 
by Justice Marshall, penned a dissent from the denial of certiorari, noting 
that such classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny because 
the targeted group is an insular minority that has suffered from a history of 
discrimination and also is politically powerless, at least once its members 
are open about their sexual orientation.
145
 The following year, in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,
146
 the Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to a 
sodomy law as applied to gays and lesbians, but in a footnote made clear 
that it was not addressing any possible equal protection challenge to the 
law.
147
 
 
 
 142. Id. at 459–60 (internal citations omitted). 
 143. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001); Lyng v. Int’l Union, 
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1986). 
 144. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). 
 145. See id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 146. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 147. See id. at 196 n.8. 
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It would not be until a decade later, in 1996, that the Court, in Romer v. 
Evans,
148
 would have the opportunity to consider an equal protection 
challenge to a law targeting gays and lesbians. At issue in the case was the 
constitutionality of Amendment 2 to Colorado’s Constitution, a voter 
initiative that both repealed existing state and local laws regarding non-
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and prohibited the future 
enactment of such laws.
149
 By this point in time, the consistency principle 
was firmly established—Adarand had been decided the previous year—
and thus the factors identified by the Frontiero Court seemed no longer 
applicable. After all, why demand that a group suffer a history of 
discrimination and be politically powerless before extending heightened 
scrutiny to laws discriminating against that group only to turn around and 
apply the same level of scrutiny to laws discriminating against its 
counterpart, who not only lacked either of those qualities but used its 
extensive political power to impose that history of discrimination? 
Thus, rather than invoking the Frontiero factors to determine whether 
discrimination against gays and lesbians was subject to intermediate or 
strict scrutiny, the Court instead first stated that “laws of the kind now 
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is 
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”150 Next, it cited 
Moreno’s holding that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
does not constitute a legitimate government interest.
151
 Finally, the Court 
declared Amendment 2 unconstitutional on the ground that it failed 
rational basis review, despite a number of rationales for the law—such as 
protecting the associational rights of others and preserving resources to 
fight more serious types of discrimination
152—that would likely have 
sufficed under traditional rational basis review.
 
Writing in dissent, Justice 
Scalia not only explained why the law passed traditional rational basis 
review, but also took issue with the Court’s characterization of gays and 
lesbians as “politically unpopular,” contending that the group “enjoys 
enormous influence in American media and politics” and had the support 
of forty-six percent of those who voted on Amendment 2 despite 
comprising no more than four percent of the population.
153
 
 
 
 148. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 149. See id. at 623–24. 
 150. Id. at 634. 
 151. See id. at 634–35. 
 152. See id. at 635–36. 
 153. Id. at 642–43, 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Had Romer represented a sporadic instance of discrimination against a 
group that otherwise failed to satisfy the factors the Court had previously 
identified for applying heightened scrutiny, it would have fit nicely in the 
Moreno-Cleburne line of cases as an instance of “fleeting rational basis 
plus” review. Yet Romer was preceded by a history of discrimination 
against gays and lesbians, including the presence of criminal sodomy laws 
that were still on the books in many states. Moreover, Romer was followed 
by an aggressive campaign to prohibit same-sex marriage by means not 
only of statutory enactments—such as the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act—but also numerous amendments to state constitutions banning same-
sex marriage and similar legal unions.
154
 Indeed, in the years since Romer 
was decided, the Court—or at least some portion of it—has thus far twice 
invoked the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer line of cases as a basis for striking 
down a law discriminating against gays and lesbians.
155
 
First, in Lawrence v. Texas,
156
 the Court once again considered a 
constitutional challenge to laws criminalizing sodomy. But the law at issue 
in Lawrence differed from that at issue in Bowers. While the latter was 
ostensibly applicable to all, including heterosexuals, the former applied 
only to same-sex sodomy.
157
 Thus, Lawrence presented not only an 
opportunity for the Court to reconsider its substantive due process holding 
in Bowers, but also a clear equal protection challenge. Yet the Court, while 
describing the equal protection argument as a “tenable” one, opted instead 
to reconsider and overturn its decision in Bowers.
158
 
Although the majority in Lawrence side-stepped the equal protection 
argument, Justice O’Connor—who was part of the majority in Bowers and 
did not wish to overrule that case’s substantive due process holding—
penned a separate concurring opinion declaring the sodomy law at issue 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
159
 Yet, like the Court in 
Romer, she did not consider the question whether intermediate or strict 
scrutiny was applicable. Rather, Justice O’Connor cited Moreno, 
Cleburne, and Romer as standing for the proposition that “[w]hen a law 
exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have 
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down 
 
 
 154. See generally NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 4. 
 155. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
 156. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 157. See id. at 562–64, 574–75. 
 158. See id. at 574–75, 578. 
 159. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”160 She cabined the scope of 
what she characterized as a heightened form of rational basis review, 
noting that it is most likely to result in declaring unconstitutional laws that 
“inhibit[] personal relationships.”161 Justice Scalia, while disagreeing with 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, characterized it as a heightened form of equal 
protection scrutiny, noting that under the test as she articulated it, “laws 
exhibiting a desire to harm a politically unpopular group are invalid even 
though there may be a conceivable rational basis to support them.”162 
Most recently, in United States v. Windsor,
163
 the Court once again 
considered an equal protection challenge involving discrimination against 
gays and lesbians, specifically, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which 
defines marriage as between a man and a woman and refuses to recognize 
marriages validly entered into in states where same-sex marriage is lawful. 
Yet the Court declined to affirm the decision on the same basis as the 
Second Circuit, which applied the Frontiero factors to arrive at the 
conclusion that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class and thus laws 
discriminating against them are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
164
 Rather, 
the Court once again quoted Moreno’s holding regarding a bare desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group, as well as its prior decision in 
Romer.
165
 The Court then identified the harms DOMA inflicts on same-sex 
couples and declared it unconstitutional.
166
 The Court did not, however, 
consider the various rationales for DOMA to determine whether it was 
sufficiently tailored to those rationales to survive rational basis, 
intermediate, or strict scrutiny. Indeed, unlike the Moreno, Cleburne, and 
Romer opinions, the Court in Windsor did not even purport to be applying 
rational basis scrutiny, but was instead murky on exactly what level of 
review it was applying, as Justice Scalia’s dissent was quick to point 
out.
167
 
While Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor each delivered victories to the 
gay-rights plaintiffs, the decisions suffer from the limitations Justice 
Marshall identified in his separate opinion in Cleburne. Specifically, the 
murkiness of the decisions has left lower courts “in the dark,” and while 
 
 
 160. See id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 164. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
 165. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–93. 
 166. Id. at 2693–96. 
 167. See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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this has resulted in some victories for proponents of gay rights, the Court’s 
failure to clearly state in any of these decisions that heightened scrutiny is 
in play has resulted in some lower courts invoking traditional rational 
basis principles to reject equal protection claims brought by gays and 
lesbians.
168
 
Moreover, with the Court having issued not one but three increasingly 
murky equal protection decisions involving gay rights and set to issue yet 
another decision in 2015,
169
 this line of cases—despite its repeated citation 
to Moreno—is starting to look less like fleeting rational basis plus and 
more like the transitional rational basis plus cases that ultimately resulted 
in the establishment of intermediate scrutiny for laws discriminating on 
the basis of sex and illegitimacy. The Court’s willingness to make that 
final step in the transition process may to some extent be hampered by 
what appears to be an irreconcilable tension between the Frontiero and 
Adarand lines of precedent. The remainder of this Article, through its 
analysis of the constitutionality of gayffirmative action policies, seeks to 
provide the Court with a roadmap for reconciling those precedents to make 
the prospect of declaring sexual orientation to be a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification a realistic one. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND TIERED SCRUTINY 
A. Race-Based Affirmative Action and Strict Scrutiny 
Between the Court’s 1978 decision in Bakke and its 2013 decision in 
Fisher, the Court has in two different ways made it increasingly difficult 
for public entities to engage in race-based affirmative action. First, it has 
thus far identified only a handful of goals that satisfy strict scrutiny’s 
requirement that the governmental interest be compelling, while in the 
meantime explicitly rejecting numerous others. Second, even when public 
entities have sought to further those goals the Court has recognized as 
compelling, strict scrutiny’s requirement that the means used to 
accomplish those goals be “narrowly tailored” to achieving those goals—
including its requirement that the state actor consider race-neutral 
alternatives and use race as a factor only when holistically evaluating 
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 
2004); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw. 2012). 
 169.  See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. 
Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571). 
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applicants—has significantly limited the circumstances under which a 
race-based affirmative action policy will pass constitutional muster. 
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged only two 
justifications for race-based affirmative action policies that satisfy strict 
scrutiny’s requirement that the government have a compelling interest for 
drawing distinctions on the basis of race. First, a governmental entity can 
implement an affirmative action policy as a remedy for past 
discrimination. However, this form of remedial affirmative action is 
narrowly circumscribed; the governmental entity seeking to implement the 
policy cannot rely merely on general societal discrimination on the basis 
of race.
170
 Rather, such a remedial policy satisfies the compelling interest 
prong of the strict scrutiny test only if the very governmental actor seeking 
to implement the policy was doing so as a remedy for past discrimination 
that the entity itself engaged in, or based on a specific finding of private 
discrimination within its jurisdiction of which a governmental entity was 
effectively a passive participant.
171
 Moreover, to justify an affirmative 
action policy on such a basis, there must be a “strong basis in evidence” 
that the prior discrimination actually occurred.
172
 Second, at least in the 
context of higher education,
173
 a governmental entity can implement a 
race-based affirmative action policy—without pointing to a prior specific 
history of discrimination—on the ground that it contributes to the 
attainment of a diverse student body from which educational benefits 
flow.
174
 
In addition to its rejection of general societal discrimination as a 
justification for implementing race-based affirmative action policies, the 
Court has thus far rejected three other proposed justifications for such 
policies. First, the Court has rejected the interest in “racial balancing,” or 
the interest in having a workforce or classroom whose racial mix tracks 
 
 
 170. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731–32 (2007) 
(plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 497–98 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 
(1986) (plurality opinion). 
 171. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 910; Croson, 488 U.S. at 497–98; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274–76. 
Moreover, where the latter is involved, the discrimination must be tied directly to the specific field or 
profession in which the governmental actor wishes to implement the affirmative action policy and the 
percentage of qualified minorities in the jurisdiction. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497–98. 
 172. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 909; Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 510; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. 
 173. The Court has suggested that the diversity rationale might not even suffice in the context of 
elementary and secondary education. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724–25. 
 174. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 325, 327–33 (2003). 
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racial demographics.
175
 Second, the Court has rejected the “role model” 
theory, whereby having people of specific races in given professions—
such as teaching—will allow them to serve as positive role models for 
children of the same race.
176
 Third, the Court has held that admitting 
minorities into specific professional programs, such as medicine, on the 
theory that they will be more likely to provide needed services to minority 
communities, is likewise not a compelling governmental interest.
177
 
Moreover, even when an affirmative action policy is enacted for the 
purpose of remedying specific past discrimination or furthering the interest 
in educational diversity, the policy must still satisfy the narrow tailoring 
requirement. In both contexts, this requires a serious consideration of race-
neutral alternatives.
178
 Furthermore, in both contexts, the use of specific 
quotas
179
 or means that otherwise rely on race in a mechanical, 
nonindividualized fashion—such as awarding a certain number of points 
in an admissions scheme for being a member of a given race
180—are 
prohibited. Rather, race can only be a factor that is part of a highly 
individualized analysis of each applicant.
181
 In addition, the Court has 
indicated that race-based affirmative action policies must be time limited 
and thus cannot be infinite in duration.
182
 Finally, the impact on non-
minorities must be considered and minimized.
183
 
In sum, as a direct result of the development of the consistency 
principle in equal protection jurisprudence, it is now extremely difficult 
for governmental entities to enact affirmative action policies—at least 
race-based ones—that will pass constitutional muster.  
 
 
 175. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729–30; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30; Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
 176. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. at 497–
98; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274–76. 
 177. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310–11. The opinion is somewhat unclear on whether the Court did 
not find this interest to be sufficiently compelling, or if instead the policy was not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to achieving that goal, or both. 
 178. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 339–43; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237–
38; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.  
 179. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507–08. 
 180. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722–23; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003); id. at 280 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 181. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507–08. 
 182. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341–42; Croson, 488 U.S. at 510. 
 183. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. 
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B. Sex-Based Affirmative Action and Intermediate Scrutiny 
In the post-Croson/Adarand era, some courts misinterpreted the 
decisions as requiring that all affirmative action policies, without regard to 
their nature, were subject to strict scrutiny, or at least viewed the issue as 
unresolved. For example, although Craig held that sex discrimination is 
subject only to intermediate scrutiny, some courts held or suggested that 
Croson and Adarand, which were decided subsequent to Craig, effectively 
modified Craig’s holding, at least so far as affirmative action was 
concerned.
184
 In still other cases—involving a mix of race-based and sex-
based affirmative action—courts did not apply a lower level of scrutiny to 
the sex-based portions of the policies because both aspects satisfied the 
higher strict scrutiny standard.
185
 
Yet with the passage of time, the overwhelming majority of federal 
courts have held that it is not the nature of the government conduct at 
issue—i.e., the fact that they are enacting an affirmative action policy—
but rather the nature of the classification employed therein that determines 
the level of scrutiny to be applied.
186
 Several such courts have noted that, 
although it seems odd that it is thus easier to enact affirmative action 
policies benefiting women than racial minorities, such a result follows 
logically from Croson.
187
 Indeed, in his dissent in Adarand in which he 
criticized the Court’s principle of consistency, Justice Stevens explained 
why he considered the holding to be such an anomaly when considered in 
tandem with the Court’s tiered levels of equal protection scrutiny: 
[T]he Court may find that its new “consistency” approach to race-
based classifications is difficult to square with its insistence upon 
rigidly separate categories for discrimination against different 
classes of individuals. For example, as the law currently stands, the 
Court will apply “intermediate scrutiny” to cases of invidious 
 
 
 184. See, e.g., Builders Ass’n v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001); Brunet v. City 
of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 403–04 (6th Cir. 1993); Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass’n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 
419, 422 (7th Cir. 1991); Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 185. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 713 F.3d 
1187, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2013); W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 
983, 990 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 186. See H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2010); Dallas Fire Fighters Ass’n 
v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438, 441–42 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1998); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 
182–83 (1st Cir. 1996); Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579–80 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1000–01 (3d Cir. 1993); Coral Constr. 
Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 930–31 (9th Cir. 1991); Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 897 F. 
Supp. 1535, 1550–51 (M.D. Ala. 1995). 
 187. See Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1579–80; Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., 6 F.3d at 1001. 
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gender discrimination and “strict scrutiny” to cases of invidious race 
discrimination, while applying the same standard for benign 
classifications as for invidious ones. If this remains the law, then 
today’s lecture about “consistency” will produce the anomalous 
result that the Government can more easily enact affirmative-action 
programs to remedy discrimination against women than it can enact 
affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against 
African-Americans—even though the primary purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former 
slaves.
188
 
The consequences of subjecting sex-based affirmative action policies only 
to intermediate scrutiny are significant. Because intermediate scrutiny is 
less demanding, both in terms of the ends identified by the government 
and the means employed for achieving those ends, governmental entities 
have much greater flexibility in implementing such policies. 
First, with respect to ends, lower courts have identified a number of 
governmental interests that, while insufficient to justify race-based 
affirmative action policies, suffice to justify sex-based ones. For example, 
lower courts have held that general societal discrimination in the relevant 
economic sector can suffice to justify such policies.
189
 Moreover, proof of 
the prior discrimination need not satisfy the “strong basis in evidence” 
standard, but instead need only be supported by evidence “‘sufficient to 
show that the preference rests on evidence-informed analysis rather than 
on stereotypical generalizations.’”190 In addition, the evidence need not be 
tied to the percentage of qualified women, but instead can be tied to 
demographics.
191
 Finally, although racial balancing is not considered to be 
a compelling governmental interest, sex balancing might be a sufficiently 
important governmental interest strong enough to withstand intermediate 
scrutiny.
192
 
With respect to means, although not explicit in the decisions, given that 
the courts permit reference to the percentage of women in the population 
rather than the percentage of qualified women and are willing to consider 
 
 
 188. 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 189. See Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 910 (11th 
Cir. 1997); Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1580; Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 932. See also Concrete Works of 
Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting the precedent so holding, but 
not deciding the issue). 
 190. Tippett, 615 F.3d at 242 (quoting Eng’g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 910); see Concrete Works, 
321 F.3d at 959–60; Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., 6 F.3d at 1000–01). 
 191. See Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1582. 
 192. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 104–05 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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general societal discrimination, “goals” that are somewhat more “quota-
like” in nature—in that they are tied more directly to the percentage of 
women in the general population—seem to be more likely to pass muster 
than similar race-based goals. In other respects, courts have held 
governmental entities to some similar requirements with respect to means, 
including a requirement that the remedies be time-limited in nature.
193
 
Indeed, in the brief period of time in which the Supreme Court itself 
applied intermediate scrutiny to race-based affirmative action policies, it 
subjected them to two of the requirements associated with strict scrutiny: 
that they be time-limited in nature and that the impact on non-minorities 
be taken into account.
194
 
C. Non-Suspect Affirmative Action and Rational Basis Review 
In litigation over gay rights on such issues as same-sex marriage, the 
constitutionality of sodomy laws, and same-sex parenting, opponents of 
gay rights have maintained a litigation stance that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is subject to nothing more than traditional 
rational basis review. In some instances, lower courts have agreed, and 
have accepted rather fanciful rationales for such laws that, at best, are 
“rationally related” to achieving those goals in the Carolene Products-Lee 
Optical sense.
195
 If that indeed is the appropriate level of review for sexual 
orientation discrimination, what sort of flexibility would governmental 
entities have in establishing gayffirmative action policies? Although the 
issue has not specifically come up in any reported cases, the bulk of 
authority would suggest that governmental entities would have an 
extraordinary amount of flexibility, both with respect to the justifications 
for establishing such policies and the means employed for accomplishing 
those goals. 
As an initial matter, just as courts have held that sex-based affirmative 
action policies are subject only to intermediate scrutiny, so too courts have 
held, and commentators have noted, that affirmative action policies based 
on non-suspect classifications—such as disability, veteran status, marital 
 
 
 193. See Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001); Christian v. 
United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 812 (2000) (but this seems to be lumping it in with strict scrutiny for 
race); Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1570. 
 194. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC., 497 U.S. 547, 594–97 (1990), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 195. See generally, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404–06 (6th Cir. 2014); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804 (11th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1111–19 (D. Haw. 2012). 
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status, tribal status, language ability, and the like—are only subject to 
rational basis review.
196
 Moreover, commentators such as Ruthann Robson 
and David Strauss have noted that, under existing precedent, gayffirmative 
action policies would only be subject to rational basis review.
197
 This is 
also consistent with the Supreme Court’s Batson198 line of cases—holding 
that peremptory challenges based on race or sex will, respectively, fail 
strict and intermediate scrutiny—while those based on non-suspect 
grounds are subject to only rational basis review and are generally 
permissible.
199
 
What, then, would such review allow for? Recall that rational basis 
review is far more deferential than both strict and intermediate scrutiny, 
requiring only “legitimate” government interests and means to accomplish 
those interests that are “rationally related” to those interests. Moreover, 
they need not even be the real motivations behind the law; hypothetical 
rationales created post hoc suffice to uphold the constitutionality of such 
laws. In addition, because the fit requirement is quite loose, such laws can 
paint with a broad brush and thus can be overinclusive, underinclusive, or 
both. 
Consider the hypothetical medical school discussed in the introduction 
that seeks to establish a quota-based system for increasing the number of 
gay and transgender students at its school, with the stated goals of creating 
role models for LGBT youth and improving the delivery of health services 
to LGBT persons. Surely, both of those are “legitimate” governmental 
interests, even if they are not “compelling” under strict scrutiny. After all, 
youth of all stripes benefit from seeing people in positions of authority that 
look like them, and surely members of the gay and transgender community 
have unique medical concerns that are no doubt sometimes overlooked by 
heterosexual practitioners (consider, as examples, such things as sexual 
disease transmission and the need for hormone treatment and sex-
reassignment surgery). 
 
 
 196. See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 & n.19 (3d Cir. 1994); Contractors Ass’n of E. 
Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993); Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, 496 
N.W.2d 829, 835–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ascher v. Kulongoski, 910 P.2d 372, 374 (Or. 1996); 
Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy 
of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REV. 281, 295–98 (1997); Donna Thompson-
Schneider, Paved with Good Intentions: Affirmative Action After Adarand?, 31 TULSA L.J. 611, 634 
(1996). 
 197. See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 
709, 719 n.48 (2002); David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 13. 
 198. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 199. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–45 (1994). 
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Indeed, three different lines of precedent provide support for the 
conclusion that a “role model” rationale for a gayffirmative action policy 
would pass rational basis review. First, there is case law holding that a law 
which allows more senior non-Indian tenured teachers to be laid off before 
laying off less senior Indian ones survives the rational basis review applied 
to tribal status
200
 on the theory that doing so ensures the existence of role 
models for Indian youth.
201
 Second, the Seventh Circuit has upheld a city 
law granting benefits to cohabiting partners of same-sex but not opposite-
sex partners of school employees, on the theory that the school district has 
an interest in providing LGBT youth with adult LGBT role models and 
such a scheme helps to attract such individuals to work in the school 
system.
202
 Finally, support for such a “role model” theory can be found in 
the many lower court decisions upholding laws banning same-sex 
marriage and same-sex parenting on the theory that the children of such 
relationships will statistically be heterosexual and thus be in need of 
heterosexual role models.
203
 Surely if that is so, then an affirmative action 
policy based on a theory that LGBT youth need LGBT adult role models 
should similarly satisfy rational basis review. 
Moreover, a quota-based system that reserves a certain percentage of 
the seats in the class for LGBT students should satisfy the fit prong of the 
rational basis test, since it need only be rationally related to the goal.
204
 If a 
governmental entity thinks that providing LGBT youth with LGBT role 
models and increasing medical services to the LGBT community are 
worthwhile goals, then surely producing doctors in rough proportion to 
their percentage of the population is a “rational” way of furthering those 
goals. Moreover, if, under intermediate scrutiny, it is permissible for 
governmental entities to tie their admission and hiring goals to 
demographics, then under rational basis review, it is undeniable that such a 
method is permissible. 
To be sure, the prospect of gayffirmative action policies springing up at 
colleges and universities nationwide might be the nightmare of many 
 
 
 200. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 201. See Krueth, 496 N.W.2d at 835–37. 
 202. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 606–07 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 203. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822 & n.19 
(11th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1116 (D. Haw. 2012); Fla. Dep’t of 
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) aff’d in relevant 
part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995); Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 370 (Mont. 2012) (Rice, J., 
concurring); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 
A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987). 
 204. See Robson, supra note 197. 
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opponents of gay rights. Indeed, it might be the sort of trigger that would 
spur at least some social conservatives to argue for heightened equal 
protection scrutiny for sexual orientation discrimination.
205
 
III. SERIAL APPLICATION OF THE FRONTIERO AND ADARAND LINES OF 
PRECEDENT 
In this part, I sketch out what might be described as a traditional 
approach to obtaining heightened scrutiny of a gayffirmative action policy. 
In so doing, I assume the continued, independent vitality of both the 
Frontiero and Adarand lines of precedent. I further assume that the path to 
consistency follows the same path as did that for race and sex, namely, 
that heightened scrutiny is first established in a case involving a law 
discriminating against the minority group—in this instance gay and 
transgender persons—and that in a subsequent case, an aggrieved 
heterosexual seeks to obtain heightened scrutiny of a gayffirmative action 
policy by invoking the precedent identifying sexual minorities as a suspect 
class in tandem with the Adarand line of precedent. 
A. Sexual Minorities and the Frontiero Factors 
Much judicial ink has been spilt on the question whether gays and 
lesbians are a suspect class. In this section, I briefly sketch out the 
arguments in favor of treating gays and lesbians as a suspect or quasi-
suspect class based on the many reported cases that have already 
addressed the issue. Virtually no cases address the question whether 
transgender persons are a suspect or quasi-suspect class, despite the fact 
that the arguments for so holding are almost certainly even stronger. 
To recap, pre-Frontiero cases spoke of the question whether the group 
at issue was a “discrete and insular” minority with a history of 
discrimination and a lack of political power, and also rejected heightened 
scrutiny for large, diverse, and amorphous classes.
206
 Frontiero identified 
six relevant considerations: (1) history of discrimination; (2) visibility of 
the characteristic; (3) political powerlessness; (4) an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by accident of birth; (5) relationship to 
ability to perform or contribute to society; and (6) the fact that a coequal 
 
 
 205. But cf. Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 608–09 (noting that Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
a gay rights organization, filed a brief on behalf of the aggrieved heterosexual in the case, arguing that 
heightened scrutiny should apply). 
 206. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
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branch of government has recognized the discrimination at issue as 
invidious.
207
 Cleburne effectively eliminated the sixth Frontiero factor by 
treating it as a factor demonstrating that the group has political power.
208
 
Moreover, Cleburne arguably narrowed the definition of political 
powerlessness, describing such groups as having “no ability to attract the 
attention of the lawmakers.”209 Finally, the Lyng Court grouped and 
presented many of the factors in the disjunctive, identifying the relevant 
inquiries as: (1) whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination; 
(2) whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and (3) whether they 
are either a minority or politically powerless.
210
 
Nearly every court to consider the matter, even those that hold that 
gays and lesbians are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, has found that 
two of the Frontiero factors—a history of discrimination211 and no effect 
on ability to perform or contribute to society
212—point in favor of 
heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, much of the debate in lower court 
opinions centers on the three remaining considerations: immutability, 
political powerlessness, and the visibility of the trait at issue. 
With respect to immutability, those courts rejecting heightened scrutiny 
for gays and lesbians note that the scientific evidence remains unclear on 
the question whether sexual orientation is immutably set at birth or 
determined at a later point in time, whether by environment or choice.
213
 
 
 
 207. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, at least one lower court has 
considered this factor and found that it points in favor of subjecting discrimination against gays and 
lesbians to heightened scrutiny. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 450–51 (Conn. 
2008). 
 209. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 84. 
 211. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987–88 (S.D. Ohio 
2013); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 959–60 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314–18 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 985–86 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008); 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432–34; Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1226 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) aff’d in relevant part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 889–90 (Iowa 2009); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609–11 (Md. 2007). 
 212. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182–83; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
988–89; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 959–60; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 318–20; Golinski, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d at 986; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 434–36; Cox, 627 So. 
2d at 1226; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 890–92; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609. 
 213. See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 614–16; Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 
2006). Some decisions have also refused to treat sexual orientation as immutable on the ground that it 
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With respect to political powerlessness, those courts rejecting 
heightened scrutiny for gays and lesbians rely on Cleburne for the 
proposition that this requires a showing that the group has no political 
power. Those courts note that gays and lesbians have achieved political 
successes and thus—in the words of Cleburne—have the ability to “attract 
the attention of the lawmakers.”214 These courts point to specific political 
successes—such as repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and the legislative 
expansion of anti-discrimination and marriage rights
215—open support by 
political leaders,
216
 and an increase in the number of openly gay elected 
officials.
217
 
Finally, with respect to visibility, at least one court has noted that, 
unlike race or sex, sexual orientation is not readily visible, making the 
case for heightened scrutiny distinguishable from that for women in 
Frontiero: “[T]he continued discrimination against women in 1973 was 
largely due to the high visibility of the sex characteristic, a visibility that 
the characteristic of homosexuality does not have to nearly the same extent 
as gender.”218 
Courts finding that gays and lesbians are a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class often begin with a threshold determination that, strictly speaking, 
none of these remaining three factors are required.
219
 In support of this 
threshold determination, these courts first note that, as indicated above, the 
 
 
is “behavioral” and thus fundamentally different from race and sex. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 
573–74; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989). These pre-Lawrence 
decisions, however, seem to be conflating the status of being gay with conduct associated with that 
status. Indeed, some of these decisions did not bother with or gave short shrift to the Frontiero factors 
on the theory that the Court’s decision in Bowers—rejecting a substantive due process claim 
challenging sodomy laws—effectively prevented consideration of equal protection claims brought by 
gays and lesbians. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464–65; Woodward, 
871 F.2d at 1076; Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 214. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 445 (1985)); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1010 (D. Nev. 2012) (same); Jackson 
v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1101–02 (D. Haw. 2012) (quoting High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 
at 574); see Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 & n.9; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 611–14; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 
974–76.. 
 215. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008, 1013; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 611–14; Andersen, 138 
P.3d at 974–75. 
 216. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
 217. See id.  
 218. Id. at 1011. 
 219. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Pedersen v. Office of 
Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326–27 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008); 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426–27 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 889 (Iowa 2009). 
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Court has, in its most recent summary of the factors in Lyng, presented 
many of them in the disjunctive. Thus, a showing of political 
powerlessness is not strictly required because the question is whether the 
group is a minority or politically powerless, and gays and lesbians, under 
any estimate of their percentage of the population, constitute a minority.
220
 
Moreover, a showing of immutability or visibility is not strictly required 
because the question is whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.
221
 
Separate and apart from the disjunctive presentation of these factors in 
cases such as Lyng, these courts note how many of the existing 
classifications accorded heightened equal protection scrutiny lack one or 
more of these characteristics. First, with respect to immutability, these 
courts point out that several suspect and quasi-suspect characteristics can 
in fact be changed: people can change their sex through surgery,
222
 aliens 
can change their status by becoming naturalized,
223
 the status of children 
as illegitimate can be changed through the marriage of their biological 
parents or other legitimization procedures,
224
 and indeed, it is possible to 
change one’s racial appearance with pigment injections.225 Indeed, so far 
as alien status is concerned, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the 
argument that it should not be accorded strict scrutiny merely because an 
alien has the ability to change that status by becoming naturalized.
226
 
Second, with respect to the visibility of the trait, several courts have 
noted that neither one’s status as an alien nor as illegitimate carries an 
obvious badge.
227
 In addition, they note that, at least in some instances, 
people can mask their national origin—such as by changing their names or 
customs—and that lighter-skinned African Americans and Latinos can 
pass as white.
228
 
Finally, with respect to political powerlessness, several courts have 
compared the political power of gays and lesbians today with that of 
 
 
 220. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 439–40. 
 221. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183. 
 222. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring); Wolf 
v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2014). 
 223. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183 n.4; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726; Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1013; 
Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 990–91; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 320; In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 442. 
 224. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183 n.4; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
990–91; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 320; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427 n.20. 
 225. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726. 
 226. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977). 
 227. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183–84; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 322. 
 228. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726. 
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women and African Americans at the times they were deemed to be 
suspect classes and have noted that the latter were certainly not wholly 
without political power then, and indeed had far more power than gays and 
lesbians do today.
229
 
Despite these threshold arguments, many courts finding gays and 
lesbians to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class have nonetheless considered 
the immutability, political powerlessness, and visibility factors and have 
found that they point in favor of heightened scrutiny. 
First, with respect to the immutability factor, numerous court 
decisions—particularly more recent ones—point to evidence 
demonstrating that sexual orientation is set at birth or shortly thereafter.
230
 
Moreover, many courts, after noting the various types of classifications 
that are theoretically mutable but nonetheless accorded heightened 
scrutiny, refine the test as one not requiring strict immutability. Rather, 
these courts hold, changing the characteristic at issue must be both 
“relatively” beyond their control and so integral to their identity that it 
would be inappropriate to require them to change it to avoid 
discrimination.
231
 So defined, these courts conclude that sexual 
orientation—like sex, race, and alienage—should be treated as immutable 
because, even if theoretically subject to change, it is difficult to do and 
something that is integral to one’s identity. 
Second, with respect to political powerlessness, these courts identify 
several ways in which gays and lesbians are relatively politically 
powerless, noting such things as the absence of statutory protections,
232
 the 
widespread enactment of anti-gay laws—such as those prohibiting sodomy 
 
 
 229. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184; Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (M.D. Pa. 
2014); Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 990; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 326–27; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 
at 442, 452–54 & n.52; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009). Moreover, several state 
courts deciding the issue on state law grounds note that this factor does not make much sense, given 
that if one were to focus on the current political power of African Americans and women, they should 
no longer receive heightened scrutiny. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008); 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 453; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 894. 
 230. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 990–91; Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 960 (E.D. 
Mich. 2013); Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 322; Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 
2d 968, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1226 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) aff’d in relevant part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995). 
 231. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183 n.4; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
990–91; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 325–26; Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 
2d at 986–87; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442–43; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 893; Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 2013). 
 232. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Pedersen, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d at 327–28; Griego, 316 P.3d at 883–84. 
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and marriage
233—the absence of significant numbers of openly gay elected 
officials,
234
 the group’s small size and dispersion,235 and the risks of being 
“out of the closet” that make it hard for gays and lesbians to organize to 
exercise political power.
236
 Moreover, these courts cite a different quote 
from Cleburne that seems to suggest that the question of political 
powerlessness turns not on whether the group is wholly lacking in political 
power, but rather whether the group’s political power is such that the 
existing discrimination against the group is unlikely to soon be rectified by 
legislative means.
237
 
Finally, with respect to visibility, and taking into consideration traits 
such as illegitimacy, alienage, and national origin that likewise are not 
visible, these courts recast this factor as meaning that the trait becomes 
obvious once the person seeks to obtain some government benefit for 
which disclosure of such facts is necessary, and note that for gays and 
lesbians, their sexual orientation, even if not normally readily visible, 
becomes apparent when they do such things as seek to obtain a license to 
marry someone of the same sex.
238
 
In sum, although there is precedent on both sides of the issue, there are 
certainly persuasive arguments for why discrimination against gays and 
lesbians should be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause based on the Frontiero factors. Moreover, although there 
is a dearth of precedent on the issue,
239
 the above arguments apply with 
equal if not greater force for transgender persons. So far as minority status 
or political powerlessness is concerned, they represent an even smaller 
percentage of the population and have far less political influence than gays 
and lesbians. Moreover, the discrimination against the group is far more 
significant, as even jurisdictions that ban discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation often fail to guard against discrimination on the basis of 
 
 
 233. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 987–88; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Pedersen, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d at 314–18; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 447–50 & n.43; Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1226; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 889–90; Griego, 316 P.3d at 883–84. 
 234. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184–85; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; 
Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 328; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 446–47; Griego, 316 P.3d at 882. 
 235. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
 236. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989–
90; Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1226; Griego, 316 P.3d at 882–83. 
 237. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184–85; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989–90; Pedersen, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d at 329; Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 987; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 
894. 
 238. See, e.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183–84. 
 239. The only federal court decisions to give it attention many decades ago held that heightened 
scrutiny was inapplicable because the trait is not an immutable one. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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gender identity. In addition, the scientific research to date shows the status 
of being transgender to be immutable; one cannot change their 
psychological gender.
240
 Furthermore, the characteristic becomes visible 
when a person seeks to alter their physical sex to conform to their 
psychological sex. Finally, there is no evidence that being transgender 
bears any relationship to one’s ability to perform and contribute to society. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of the remainder of this section and the 
next section, this Article assumes that gay and transgender persons qualify 
as classes entitled to heightened equal protection scrutiny, and proceeds to 
consider the impact of that assumption on the ability of heterosexuals 
aggrieved by gayffirmative action policies to likewise argue for 
heightened equal protection scrutiny. 
B. Sexual Minorities and Adarand Consistency 
Assume, for the reasons set forth in the previous subsection, that the 
U.S. Supreme Court eventually concludes that gay and transgender 
persons qualify as suspect or quasi-suspect classes entitled to heightened 
scrutiny, or that the relevant circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has 
precedent so holding, as does the Second Circuit.
241
 Suppose further that a 
gayffirmative action policy is established, and an aggrieved heterosexual 
seeks to challenge it. With heightened scrutiny already established for 
discrimination against sexual minorities, the question whether the plaintiff 
can likewise argue for heightened scrutiny turns solely on the question 
whether Adarand’s principle of consistency would apply to an equal 
protection claim brought by a heterosexual claiming sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
In many ways, it seems hard to argue that Adarand’s consistency 
principle should not apply to sexual orientation claims. After all, as 
demonstrated in Part I of this Article, the seeds of the consistency 
principle were sown long before Croson and Adarand were decided, with 
the Court applying it sub silentio to sex classifications
242
 and assuming 
that it would apply if the Court treated the mentally retarded as a quasi-
suspect class.
243
 In line with this general trajectory, one lower court has 
concluded that the consistency principle would apply to policies granting 
 
 
 240. See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 75–77 (Md. 2003). 
 241. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181–85. 
 242. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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preferential treatment to other suspect groups, such as aliens,
244
 and the 
handful of courts and commentators that have addressed the issue have 
indicated that the same result would follow for sexual orientation.
245
 
Yet despite the allure of having a “consistency” principle that applies 
consistently across all classifications, it might nonetheless be possible to 
argue against it being extended to encompass sexual orientation 
classifications. As an initial matter, it is worth emphasizing that the Court 
has applied it only in the contexts of sex and race discrimination. In 
addition, although Cleburne seems to assume its application more 
generally, that assumption was not necessary to deciding the case. 
Moreover, many of the cases in the Adarand line emphasize the 
importance of racial classifications and suggest that race is different. For 
example, in Bakke, Justice Powell suggested that race and ethnicity were 
sui generis.
246
 Justice O’Connor did much the same in Adarand, in which 
she focused specifically on the long history of misuse of race as a basis for 
treating all racial classifications with skepticism.
247
 And the specific 
language of the consistency principle in both Croson and Adarand was not 
written in general terms but rather in specific reference to race.
248
 
However, I would suggest a more critical distinction in both the race 
and sex cases that would explain why a consistency principle was 
necessary in those cases but is not necessary in the context of sexual 
orientation. Specifically, one needs to consider the context of the initial 
heightened scrutiny cases involving race and sex to see why a consistency 
principle made sense for those two types of classifications. 
The two race cases in which strict scrutiny was first clearly 
articulated—McLaughlin and Loving—involved laws criminalizing 
interracial pairings of different sorts.
249
 In any given pairing, it is unclear 
which person is being discriminating against. Indeed, the Court in these 
cases had to rebut arguments, based on its own precedent, that no racial 
discrimination was involved at all because whites and non-whites were 
equally prohibited from engaging in the conduct with people of opposite 
 
 
 244. See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012). See generally Pemberthy v. 
Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 n.19 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 245. See Commonwealth v. Chau, No. 08-P-2043, 2010 WL 1655526, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 
27, 2010); David A. Strauss, supra note 197.. 
 246. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213–27 (1995). 
 248. See id. at 224, 227; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
 249. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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races.
250
 Thus, viewing the strict scrutiny standard as applying consistently 
whenever race is taken into account, without looking to the race of the 
specific plaintiff, made sense given the context in which these cases arose. 
Because consistency was necessary to deciding these cases, it would have 
been difficult, or at least awkward, for the Court to back away from that in 
subsequent cases in which a principle of consistency was not strictly 
necessary. 
The early sex discrimination cases in which heightened scrutiny was 
recognized similarly involved situations in which a consistency prism was 
necessary because it was unclear whether men or women were being 
discriminated against, as each of these early cases involved a denial of 
benefits to spouses. Keep in mind that these cases were decided in a world 
in which same-sex marriage was not in existence, and so all married 
pairings were necessary male-female. For example, at issue in Frontiero 
was the constitutionality of a federal statutory scheme whereby male 
members of the armed forces automatically received medical and other 
benefits for their wives because they were presumed to be dependent upon 
their husbands, whereas female members of the armed forces could 
receive such benefits for their husbands only if they could first prove the 
dependence.
251
 Were such laws discriminating against the female 
servicemembers, or their male husbands who were denied the benefits? 
Indeed, in Frontiero, the servicemember and her husband brought suit 
jointly.
252
 Other pre-Craig cases involved similar circumstances, such as a 
provision of the Social Security Act allowing a surviving wife to receive 
benefits based on the earnings of her deceased husband but not providing 
for a surviving husband to do the same based on the earnings of his 
deceased wife.
253
 Who was discriminated against in that case, the earning 
wife whose social security benefits effectively had less value than those of 
a male earner, or the surviving male spouse who was denied the benefits? 
Thus, just as with cases like McLaughlin and Loving, a principle of 
consistency made sense. And having established that principle early on, 
subsequently backing away from it would have been difficult. 
While I thus believe that there are significant ways in which the Court 
can distinguish the existing Adarand line of cases, it is nonetheless 
conceivable, indeed likely, that the Court would extend its rationale to 
 
 
 250. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10–11; McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188–91. 
 251. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973) (plurality opinion).  
 252. See id. at 680 & n.4. 
 253. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637–38 (1975). 
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encompass sexual orientation classifications. For purposes of the next Part, 
I assume that to be the Court’s likely trajectory. 
IV. MUST A HETEROSEXUAL “WAIT IN LINE” TO OBTAIN HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY? 
Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has not designated gays and lesbians 
to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate or strict 
equal protection scrutiny, and there is only one federal circuit—the 
Second—with precedent so holding.254 (The Ninth Circuit, without 
specifying the level of review, recently held that the scrutiny for 
discrimination against gays and lesbians is “heightened.”255) Accordingly, 
if an equal protection challenge is brought against a gayffirmative action 
policy by an aggrieved heterosexual outside of the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, the legal question is not merely whether Adarand’s consistency 
principle applies outside of the contexts of race and sex discrimination. 
The question is whether a heterosexual can invoke heightened scrutiny 
without that level of scrutiny having first been established for laws 
discriminating against sexual minorities. There are five possible responses 
to this question: 
1. No, he must first wait for that level of scrutiny to be established 
in a case involving discrimination against sexual minorities, and 
only then seek extension of that level of scrutiny to discrimination 
against heterosexuals by invoking that new precedent in conjunction 
with Adarand. 
2. Yes, but in so doing, he must argue the various ways in which 
the Frontiero factors demonstrate that heterosexuals are politically 
powerless, have suffered from a history of discrimination, and the 
like. 
3. Yes, but in so doing, he must argue the various ways in which 
the Frontiero factors demonstrate that his opposite, i.e., gays and 
lesbians, are politically powerless, have suffered from a history of 
discrimination, and the like. 
 
 
 254. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
 255. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 
740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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4. Yes, by invoking the Moreno line of cases and contending that 
heterosexuals are a politically unpopular group. 
5. Yes, and in so doing, he must get the court to think about the 
Frontiero factors in a more abstract way that harmonizes them with 
the Adarand principle. 
I can envision litigants arguing for and lower courts accepting each of 
the first four responses. As I explain below, although the first three 
responses might be said to follow mechanically from the Court’s 
precedents, they are largely nonsensical if one accepts the Adarand line of 
precedent as settled law that is applicable across the board. The fourth 
response, while raising some interesting questions about the scope of the 
Moreno line of cases, seems unlikely to bear fruit. Only the fifth response, 
if accepted, will ultimately harmonize the Frontiero, Adarand, and 
Moreno lines of precedent. 
A. The Mechanical Responses 
The first three responses are emblematic of a lawyer or jurist who has 
memorized and can recite complex constitutional doctrine, but does not, in 
truth, understand it. I address each of them briefly here, cognizant of the 
possibility that a lower court may nonetheless feel compelled to accept one 
of them on the theory that it is for the Supreme Court, not lower courts, to 
blaze new trails. 
The first response—that an aggrieved heterosexual must wait until a 
sexual minority establishes heightened scrutiny in a case involving 
discrimination against sexual minorities before arguing for its extension to 
laws discriminating against heterosexuals—treats these two lines of 
precedent as artificially independent and hopelessly wooden. After all, if 
heterosexuals will be able to instantly and forever after invoke that level of 
heightened scrutiny upon the establishment of the same in a case involving 
discrimination against sexual minorities, what sensible concept of 
constitutional law would force the aggrieved heterosexual to sit idly 
waiting for that precedent to first be established? 
There is, however, one possible defense of this first response. It may be 
that the Court intends Adarand consistency to follow not instantly from 
recognition of a group as suspect or quasi-suspect, but rather with a delay. 
After all, that was the pattern followed for race and, to a lesser extent, 
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sex.
256
 During this lag period, laws discriminating against the group are 
subject to heightened scrutiny, while those designed to benefit them are 
not, allowing legislatures greater flexibility to remedy the history of 
discrimination against the group. But at some point, the political power of 
the suspect or quasi-suspect group may shift, such that the political 
powerlessness arguments for heightened scrutiny may no longer hold, as 
Justice Scalia has suggested is the case for women.
257
 Moreover, it need 
not (and probably never would) shift to the point that the minority group 
becomes the majority;
258
 rather, it suffices that they progress politically to 
the point that they can, at least in some instances, hold the balance of 
power.
259
 Yet because the Court never downgrades a suspect or quasi-
suspect group once it has recognized them as such,
260
 the Court’s solution 
to this change in political power is to apply the Adarand consistency 
principle as a way of effectively downgrading the group’s heightened 
scrutiny. 
The second response—that an aggrieved heterosexual must 
demonstrate that heterosexuals are politically powerless, have suffered 
from a history of discrimination, and the like—is a response that has on 
occasion been given by courts when a law appearing to give preferential 
treatment to a minority group (for which heightened scrutiny has not been 
established) has been challenged, such as for laws that appear to 
discriminate against heterosexuals or the wealthy.
261
 This response tracks 
the dissents of Justice Rehnquist in Craig and Justice Marshall in Croson, 
who contended that heightened scrutiny should not be extended, 
respectively, to men and whites on the theory that those groups do not 
satisfy the Frontiero factors.
262
 Yet, as demonstrated above, the Court 
rejected those dissents. To be sure, in those cases, the Frontiero and 
Adarand lines of cases were invoked serially, not in tandem. But given the 
change that Adarand has made to the legal landscape, allowing heightened 
scrutiny for heterosexuals only if they can show that they have suffered 
 
 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 51–58, 69–72, 89–117. 
 257. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 258. But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295–97 (1978). 
 259. See Ohio Contractors Ass’n v. City of Columbus, 733 F. Supp. 1156, 1158–59 (S.D. Ohio 
1990). 
 260. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 502 n.25 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., 
dissenting). 
 261. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2001); Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 111. 
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from a history of discrimination and are politically powerless would seem 
to unduly straightjacket equal protection jurisprudence. 
The third response is perhaps the least mechanical of this group. Under 
this response, heterosexuals are free to argue for heightened scrutiny in the 
first instance, invoking the Frontiero and Adarand lines of precedent. 
Moreover, it is not necessary for them to show that heterosexuals satisfy 
the Frontiero factors, which they almost surely would not. Rather, so long 
as they can show that their opposite—gays and lesbians—can do so, they 
can establish heightened equal protection scrutiny across the board for 
sexual orientation. While certainly a plausible way to reconcile the 
Frontiero and Adarand lines of precedent, it is an awfully bizarre way to 
ask the heterosexual plaintiff to make the case for why heightened equal 
protection scrutiny should apply to his case, to wit, by speaking of the 
political powerlessness and history of discrimination against a group to 
which he does not belong. Perhaps the answer is that the plaintiff’s role in 
this scenario is bizarre because Adarand itself is an aberration. That might 
be so, but the Court clearly accepts Adarand and is unlikely to reconcile 
the two lines of cases in such a Frankensteinesque manner. 
B. Heterosexuals as a “Politically Unpopular Group”? 
Perhaps the way for an aggrieved heterosexual to obtain some form of 
heightened scrutiny is the same way that gays and lesbians have thus far 
achieved it: by invoking Moreno-style “fleeting rational basis plus” review 
under fact patterns that show evidence of animus in the legislative history. 
Consider in this regard the medical school affirmative action policy set 
forth in the introduction, with a new caveat. At the faculty meeting, while 
introducing the policy, the lead sponsor states, “The best thing about this 
policy is I’m guaranteed to see five percent fewer ‘breeders’ each time I 
walk into class.” The faculty receive the policy with laughter and vote 
resoundingly in favor of it. Assume further that the medical school has a 
lesbian dean and sexual minorities in a variety of key leadership positions. 
This hypothetical raises important questions of what it means to be a 
“politically unpopular group” within the meaning of the Moreno-
Cleburne-Romer line of cases. To be politically unpopular seems to be 
another way of saying that a group is politically powerless, thus 
overlapping with one of the Frontiero factors. Is it about political power 
generally—say a group’s national political power—or is it a more 
localized, case-specific analysis of a group’s political power in a given 
circumstance, such that a group that is politically powerful in general may 
be politically neutered in a given context, as was the case under the facts 
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of Croson
263
 or the hypothetical jurisdiction in Strauder in which whites 
were in the minority?
264
 
A review of lower court precedent addressing the issue suggests that 
the analysis whether a group qualifies as politically unpopular is often not 
done at the micro-level, but rather at a macro-level. For example, despite 
the fact that numerous political bodies have enacted laws targeting 
Walmart, courts have rejected arguments that the retailer or other similar, 
generally powerful entities should be characterized as “politically 
unpopular group[s]” within the meaning of Moreno and its progeny.265 In 
contrast, lower courts have held that groups such as day laborers
266
 and the 
homeless
267
 satisfy Moreno’s definition. The bulk of lower court precedent 
thus seems to align the analysis here with the political powerlessness 
analysis associated with the application of the Frontiero factors, limiting 
the application of fleeting rational basis review to situations involving a 
minority group—albeit not one that qualifies generally for intermediate or 
strict scrutiny—being disadvantaged by the majority268 that is historically 
unpopular and politically vulnerable.
269
 Such a characterization might 
encompass hippies, the mentally retarded, day laborers, and the homeless 
but not a large and otherwise powerful retailer. Under this limited 
interpretation of Moreno’s scope, heterosexuals would not seem to qualify 
as a “politically unpopular group.” 
On the other hand, some courts do seem to conduct a more micro-level 
analysis, focusing on the particular geographic and political context in 
which a given targeted group operates. For example, even though there is 
significant support for abortion rights generally and Planned Parenthood 
and other abortion providers specifically, numerous lower courts have held 
that Planned Parenthood qualifies as a politically unpopular group, noting 
 
 
 263. See text accompanying note 113. 
 264. See text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 265. See Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 919 F.2d 593, 599 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that private utility companies do not meet the definition of a politically unpopular 
group); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 501 (D. Md. 2006). But see Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1037–39 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (noting the 
dearth of precedent on this issue, and holding that the argument was not “totally without merit”).  
 266. See Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 552 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 267. See Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Chosen 300 
Ministries, Inc. v. City of Phila., No. 12-3159, 2012 WL 3235317, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012) 
(collecting cases). 
 268. See Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1250–53 (N.D. Ala. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 
Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 269. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012); 
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of 
Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1119 n.6 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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its unpopularity among some segments of the population.
270
 Viewed 
through this prism, it seems plausible that heterosexuals could—in the 
right political and geographic context (such as a factual context akin to 
that in Croson)—satisfy the definition. 
The Court—speaking through Justice Kennedy—in its Moreno line of 
cases appears to endorse the micro-approach over the macro-approach. In 
Kelo v. City of New London,
271
 Justice Kennedy stated that “a court 
applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must 
strike down a government classification that is clearly intended to injure a 
particular class of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public 
justifications.”272 So described, the standard seems to be of universal 
application, and not limited to traditionally vulnerable parties. 
To be sure, a criticism of considering a micro-level analysis would note 
Justice White’s comment in Cleburne that “[a]ny minority can be said to 
be powerless to assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a 
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social 
legislation would now be suspect.”273 But of course there, Justice White 
was speaking of the possibility of applying the strong medicine of either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny. In contrast, fleeting rational basis plus 
review is seldom that blunt of a tool. 
Yet another criticism might be that since there is almost always some 
political loser in any political decision, this interpretation of Moreno 
would signal a return to the Lochner days of heavy-handed rational basis 
review to scrutinize and strike down legislation. However, there are 
several limitations on the scope of Moreno-style review that make it 
unlikely to be a significant intrusion into legislative powers. 
First, in order for its heightened standard to apply, the cases suggest 
that there needs to be some evidence of animus in the legislative record, or 
a desire to punish or target a particular group.
274
 Thus, in the absence of 
such evidence, this more intense review does not take place. 
 
 
 270. See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 545–46 (9th Cir. 2004); Greenville 
Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 205 (4th Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 612 
F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 448 U.S. 901; Planned Parenthood v. Cansler, 877 F. Supp. 2d 
310, 327 (M.D.N.C. 2012); Planned Parenthood v. Dreyzehner, 853 F. Supp. 2d 724, 737–38 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2012). 
 271. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 272. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 273. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985). 
 274. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448; 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 n.18 (1974); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
538 (1973). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
786 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:733 
 
 
 
 
Second, even when Moreno-style review applies, it is more akin to 
“hard look” administrative review than true heightened scrutiny. Thus, 
according to the Court, the presence of evidence of animus in the record 
“does not a constitutional violation make”;275 so long as there is a rational 
basis for the law, the Court will still uphold it in spite of that evidence.
276
 
Finally, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor 
suggested a third limitation on Moreno-style review: in general, it is only 
likely to result in laws inhibiting personal relationships being declared 
unconstitutional, and does not apply to ordinary economic legislation.
277
 
Of course, even if the micro-level approach to Moreno were to rule the 
day, it likely would not ultimately help an aggrieved heterosexual in the 
affirmative action hypothetical described above. To be sure, the statement 
by the policy’s sponsor might be sufficient evidence of animus to have a 
court give the policy a hard look, but it is likely that the court will also 
find a variety of rational bases for such a law, independent of that animus. 
Finally, unlike the laws at issue in cases such as Moreno, Cleburne, and 
Romer, it would be hard to characterize an affirmative action policy as 
inhibiting personal relationships, at least in the way Justice O’Connor 
suggested, which appeared to focus primarily on intimate settings and the 
home. 
C. A New Paradigm 
In my view, the best way to harmonize the Moreno, Frontiero, and 
Adarand lines of cases is to formally re-conceptualize them as 
representing two distinct paths to obtaining heightened equal protection 
scrutiny, and to realign and abstract the Frontiero factors in a way that 
aligns with the distinct purposes of these two different categories of 
heightened equal protection scrutiny. 
Moreno-style review is fleeting, not permanent. It is not designed to 
identify a suspect or quasi-suspect trait and thereafter apply heightened 
 
 
 275. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). 
 276. See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gallagher v. 
City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1021 (8th Cir. 2012); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61–62 (1st Cir. 
2008); Univ. Prof’ls of Ill. v. Edgar, 114 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1997); N.Y. Trawlers Ass’n v. 
Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1310 (2d Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1104–05 
(D. Haw. 2012) (noting that it applies only where there is a bare desire to harm a group, not where 
there are other justifications for the law). 
 277. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); accord 
Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–
25 (10th Cir. 2004); Hope for Families & Cmty. Serv., Inc., v. Warren, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1152 
n.75 (M.D. Ala. 2010). 
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scrutiny to laws discriminating on that basis. Rather, it is designed for 
breakdowns in the political process, like when a legislature selects a 
particular course of conduct with the purpose of targeting and harming a 
situation-specific, politically unpopular group. In this circumstance, the 
target of the legislation can truly be said to be politically powerless, and 
the Court’s temporary intervention would seem to be consistent with 
footnote four of Carolene Products, which is concerned generally with 
breakdowns in the political process.
278
 Accordingly, the “political 
powerlessness” consideration that is often a part of the Frontiero analysis 
is best excised from that context and considered part of the criteria for 
fleeting rational basis plus review, with political powerlessness defined at 
the micro-level rather than at the macro-level. 
This leaves four other major factors for courts to consider in deciding 
whether permanent intermediate or strict scrutiny is appropriate for 
particular classifications under a Frontiero-Adarand analysis. Of these, 
three of them are already well-suited to Adarand’s consistency principle, 
and thus do not require any abstraction or re-characterization at all: 
immutability, visibility, and relationship to ability to perform or contribute 
to society. Consider each of these in the context of sexual orientation. If 
homosexuality is immutable, visible, and unrelated to ability to perform or 
contribute to society as those terms have been defined in the case law, then 
heterosexuality is likewise immutable,
279
 visible, and unrelated to ability to 
perform or contribute to society. The same holds for other types of suspect 
or quasi-suspect classifications, such as sex and race. 
That leaves the history of discrimination factor. This factor can easily 
be re-characterized so that the question is not whether the specific class 
that the plaintiff is a member of has suffered a history of discrimination, 
but instead whether there has been a history of misuse of a generally 
irrelevant characteristic. While the actual history will in virtually every 
instance involve solely misuse targeting the minority group, in the long 
run, concern over misuse of a generally irrelevant characteristic is a 
concern for all. Many of the decisions in the Adarand line of cases seem to 
suggest a concern that, given a long history of misuse of a generally 
irrelevant characteristic, once the minority has been able to obtain some 
 
 
 278. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating that 
heightened scrutiny is warranted both when there is “legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” as well as 
when there is “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”) (emphasis 
added). 
 279. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring). 
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degree of political power, the reverberations of history are likely to result 
in retaliatory action aimed at the majority group.
280
 Thus, such a history of 
misuse warrants greater scrutiny by the courts whenever that characteristic 
comes into play. Indeed, the Court’s more recent decisions discuss the 
history of misuse of race or sex in opinions in which the aggrieved 
plaintiff is white or male.
281
 
To be sure, there are many critics of Adarand’s consistency principle, 
and they might find my proposed refinement of the Frontiero factors 
abhorrent to their preferred interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
But Adarand is here to stay, and the unresolved tension between it and the 
Frontiero line of cases has done much to harm efforts to advance the 
rights of sexual minorities and other minority groups because it has 
effectively stalled the development of the Frontiero line of cases. Only by 
providing a map for the Court to harmonize the two lines of cases is there 
hope for the Court to add to its list of suspect and quasi-suspect 
classifications. 
V. THE RELEVANCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Suppose that little or none of what I have discussed thus far comes to 
fruition. Instead, the Court explicitly holds that under the U.S. 
Constitution, discrimination against gays and lesbians is entitled only to 
rational basis scrutiny. Or the Court reserves judgment on that question 
but holds that until that issue is resolved, a heterosexual cannot 
successfully invoke heightened scrutiny. Under those circumstances, is 
there any other way that an aggrieved heterosexual plaintiff can obtain 
heightened equal protection scrutiny of a gayffirmative action policy?  
It is an elemental principle of constitutional law that the U.S. 
Constitution sets a floor, not a ceiling, and thus that states are able to 
interpret parallel provisions in their own constitutions to provide greater 
protections than are provided by the U.S. Constitution.
282
 Moreover, the 
Court has made clear that this principle extends to how states interpret 
their analogues to the Equal Protection Clause.
283
 Numerous states have 
 
 
 280. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 495–96 (1989) 
(plurality opinion); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295–99 (1978). 
 281. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136–39 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 650–51 (1993). 
 282. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s 
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). 
 283. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981). 
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opted to do so in various contexts, with many states applying strict instead 
of merely intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on sex
284
 or 
legitimacy.
285
 Moreover, a number of states have applied intermediate or 
strict scrutiny instead of merely rational basis review to classifications 
based on age,
286
 wealth,
287
 or disability.
288
 And most relevant to this 
Article, several states have held that discrimination against gays and 
lesbians is subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny, including 
California,
289
 Connecticut,
 290
 and Iowa.
291
 
Thus, suppose the gayffirmative action policy at issue were established 
at a state university in California, Connecticut, or Iowa. Would courts in 
those states apply the Adarand principle, as a matter of state constitutional 
law, to subject laws discriminating against heterosexuals to intermediate 
or strict scrutiny? Must they do so as a matter of federal constitutional 
law? 
As to the first question, only a handful of decisions have addressed the 
issue—all outside of the context of sexual orientation discrimination—and 
they have provided mixed results (many others have simply applied the 
consistency rule without discussion).
292
 For example, California courts, 
which have long applied strict scrutiny to sex-based discrimination, have 
held that such scrutiny also applies to affirmative action policies designed 
to benefit women.
293
 In contrast, California courts, which have also held 
that laws that discriminate against the poor are subject to strict scrutiny (at 
least in some circumstances), have rejected an argument that consistency 
 
 
 284. See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539–40 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Baehr v. Lewin, 
852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Commonwealth v. Chou, 
741 N.E.2d 17, 24 n.6 (Mass. 2001); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 386 (Md. 1989); 
Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 977–78 (Or. 1982); In re McLean, 725 
S.W.2d 696, 697–98 (Tex. 1987); Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760, 763–66 (W. Va. 1980). 
 285. See Taylor v. Hoffman, 544 S.E.2d 387, 392 (W. Va. 2001); Adkins v. McEldowney, 280 
S.E.2d 231, 233 (W. Va. 1981). 
 286. See Hamm v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 388, 393 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1979); State v. 
Anderson, 996 So. 2d 973, 1010–11 (La. 2008). 
 287. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950–51 (Cal. 1976), supplemented by 569 P.2d 1303 
(Cal. 1977). 
 288. See Rayhall v. Akim Co., 819 A.2d 803, 813 (Conn. 2003); Frandsen v. Cnty. of Brevard, 
800 So. 2d 757, 759–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 120 P.3d 413, 419–
23 (N.M. 2005). 
 289. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 78 (Cal. 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441–
44 (Cal. 2008). 
 290. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–82 (Conn. 2008). 
 291. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885–96 (Iowa 2009). 
 292. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Commonwealth v. Chou, 741 
N.E.2d 17, 24 n.6 (Mass. 2001); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 977–78 (Or. 
1982); In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697–98 (Tex. 1987). 
 293. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 25–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
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requires an extension of that level of scrutiny to laws that discriminate 
against the wealthy.
294
 Moreover, Connecticut courts, which accord strict 
scrutiny to laws that discriminate against the disabled, do not extend that 
same level of scrutiny to laws that discriminate in their favor.
295
 
As to the second question, it would appear that states are free to impose 
differing levels of scrutiny on laws discriminating against sexual 
minorities and those discriminating against heterosexuals and not run afoul 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution so long as federal 
precedent accords only rational basis scrutiny to such classifications. To 
be sure, a state constitutional provision can be deemed to run afoul of the 
federal Equal Protection Clause,
296
 and the Court has made clear that a 
state constitutional provision that is interpreted so as to expansively grant 
rights to one group can, in the course of so doing, violate the federal 
constitutional rights of another and be subject to challenge on that 
ground.
297
 
But the Adarand line of cases does not declare a federal constitutional 
right to have a “consistent” level of scrutiny applied across the board by 
state courts interpreting state analogues to the federal Equal Protection 
Clause. Instead, those decisions set a federal floor for equal protection 
review, requiring a minimum of strict scrutiny for racial classifications and 
intermediate scrutiny for sex classifications. Thus, a state that opted to 
apply intermediate scrutiny to laws discriminating against women but only 
rational basis review to laws discriminating against men would run afoul 
of the federal Equal Protection Clause, as would a state that opted to apply 
strict scrutiny to laws discriminating against racial minorities but only 
intermediate scrutiny to laws discriminating against whites. 
Yet, if a state decided to satisfy the federal constitutional floor for one 
class—such as heterosexuals—and to impose a higher level of scrutiny for 
its counterpart—sexual minorities—the constitutionality of that scheme 
would turn on whether it satisfies the level of federal equal protection 
scrutiny normally applied to those types of classifications. If the federal 
Equal Protection Clause thus provides only for rational basis review of 
sexual orientation classifications, the federal constitutional question would 
 
 
 294. See Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); People v. 
Mitchell, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 295. See Pasquariello v. Stop and Shop Cos., Inc., 916 A.2d 803, 813 (Conn. 2007); Rayhall v. 
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interpretation of state’s analogue to First Amendment can run afoul of federal Takings Clause to the 
extent it provides a right to engage in that conduct on the private property of others). 
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reduce itself to whether it is rational for the state constitution to subject 
such laws to differing levels of scrutiny depending upon the class 
impacted. The same deference under that standard that results in upholding 
the constitutionality of most specific laws discriminating on a non-suspect 
basis should likewise result in upholding the constitutionality of such a 
state constitutional scheme. 
In this sense, inconsistency by states via the application of their 
analogues to the federal Equal Protection Clause is no different than any 
other form of inconsistency that occurs when a state chooses to 
discriminate in favor of or against any given class. If a state’s decision to 
discriminate against sexual minorities is subject only to rational basis 
review under the federal Equal Protection Clause when a state chooses to 
permit only heterosexuals to marry or adopt children, then logically its 
decision to discriminate in favor of sexual minorities through the 
application of a more stringent level of scrutiny under the state analogue to 
the federal Equal Protection Clause should similarly be subject only to 
rational basis review. 
In sum, it may be that an aggrieved plaintiff living in one of the 
handful of states that have applied heightened scrutiny under their state 
constitutions to laws discriminating against sexual minorities might, as a 
matter of state constitutional law, persuasively argue for extension of that 
standard to laws discriminating against heterosexuals. But if a state 
declines to do so, a federal constitutional challenge to such a scheme rises 
or falls on the same arguments as those involved in determining whether 
to have heightened scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause for 
sexual orientation classifications. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have demonstrated the various ways in which a 
heterosexual plaintiff could challenge a sexual orientation-based 
affirmative action policy. I have argued that such a plaintiff should be able 
to argue for heightened equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation 
classifications without waiting for that standard to first be established in a 
case involving discrimination against sexual minorities. In the course of so 
doing, I have provided a roadmap for harmonizing several of the Court’s 
parallel and sometimes contradictory lines of equal protection precedent. 
While at first glance, it might seem strange to use such a case to 
establish heightened equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation 
classifications, it would not be the first time the Court has furthered the 
longer-term interests of minorities in a case in which the aggrieved party 
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was in the majority. As an example, the Court first declared the 
constitutionality of hate crimes statutes in a case in which the victim was 
white and the perpetrators were black.
298
 Moreover, with Justice Kennedy 
as the swing vote in (and author of) each of the major gay rights cases 
decided by the Court, his support for gay rights coupled with his general 
distaste for affirmative action might make such a case the perfect factual 
setting for the Court to announce heightened scrutiny for sexual 
orientation discrimination and also resolve a longstanding tension in the 
Court’s equal protection precedents.It may be that the Court will instead 
choose to establish heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation 
classifications in a more traditional way. Specifically, the Court is set to 
issue an opinion in 2015 addressing the question whether state laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage violate equal protection.
299
 The Court might 
opt to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny in that case, and in a 
subsequent case address the question whether that same level of 
heightened scrutiny would apply to laws that discriminate in favor of 
sexual minorities. Anticipating that possibility, this Article has likewise 
provided a roadmap for harmonizing the tension in the Court’s equal 
protection precedents in such a serial fashion.   
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